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LEGAL THEORETIC INADEQUACY AND OBESITY
EPIDEMIC ANALYSIS

David G. Yosifon·

INTRODUCTION
This Article explores crucial analytic and normative limitations in pre
sently dominant and ascendant approaches to legal theory. The approaches'
failure to provide a satisfying framework for analyzing the obesity epidemic
presently raging undeterred in American society reveals these limitations.l
Conventional law and economics scholars writing on the subject have de
ployed familiar frameworks to reach predictable conclusions that are nei
ther intellectually nor morally justifiable.2 This Article argues that recent
theoretical innovations promulgated within the burgeoning law and behav
ioralism movement have thus far provided no more reliable a framework
for legal analysis of the obesity epidemic than has conventional law and
economics. This Article critiques in particular the behavioral law and eco
nomics concepts of "libertarian paternalism"3 and "asymmetric paternal
ism,"4 as well

as

the concept of "expressive overdeterminism," recently

developed by proponents of "cultural cognition theory."5 This proj ect is
undertaken as part of a broader effort to develop an alternative approach to
legal theory that previous co-authors and I call "critical realism."6 The theo•
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I

See infra

text accompanying notes

8-12

(describing the scale and implications of the obesity

epidemic).

2

See infra

Part II (discussing conventional legal economists' assessment of the obesity epi-

demic).

3

See infra text accompanying notes 116-51 (discussing libertarian paternalism).
See irifra text accompanying notes Part m.B (discussing asymmetric paternalism).
5 See infra Part IV (discussing cultural cognition theory).
6 See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to The Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 176-92
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retical arguments herein are broad, but this Article aims to also advance
obesity epidemic analysis in particular. Part V briefly discusses specific
public policy implications of my assessment, with special reference to a
policy innovation based in the reform of corporate law.7

I.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

A.

The Obesity Epidemic
The number of Americans who are obese or overweight has risen dra

33% of the population is
obese and 66% overweight, up from just 15% obese and 47% overweight

matically over the last several decades. Today

only two decades ago.8 This trend continues upwards and so far shows no
signs of abating. The health consequences of the epidemic are calarnitous
overweight and obesity are associated with increased risk of diabetes, heart
disease, liver disease, kidney disease, various types of cancer, impotence,
depression, and premature death.9 The latest research suggests that not only
the obese, but also the merely overweight bear a significant risk of de-

(2003) [hereinafter The Situation] (providing an introduction and overview of critical realism); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human
Animal, 93 GEO. LJ. 1, 34-133 (2004) [hereinafter The Situ ational Character] (providing a comprehen
sive treatment of the social science on which the concept of human agency relied upon in critical realism
is based); Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in
A merica, 53 EMORY LJ. 1645, 1675-88 (2004) [hereinafter Broken Scales] (applying the critical realist
framework to analysis of the obesity epidemic).
7 See infra Part V.
8 National Center for Health Statistics, Prevalence of Overweight and Obesity Among Adults:
United States 2003-2004, http://www.cdc.gov/nchslproductslpubs/pubd/hestats/overweightfoverwghC
adulc03.htrn. "Obese" and "overweight" are defined with reference to Body Mass Index (BMn, a
measurement that captures a person's weight in relation to their height-BMI equals weight divided by
height squared. See http://www.nhlbisupport.comlbmi (last visited Feb. 26, 2(08) (providing a user
friendly BMI calculator as well as explanation of the health implications of different BMI ranges). A
BMI of twenty-five or higher is considered "overweight" and thirty or higher is considered "obese. " Id.
These categories correspond with heightened health risks. National Heart Lung and Blood Institute
Obesity Education Initiative, http://www.nhlbi.nih.govlhealthlpubliclheartlobesityllose wtfrisk.htrn (last
visited Feb. 26, 2(08). BMI is useful as a measure of the health status of broad populations. For any
given individual, a relatively high BMI might not indicate a heightened risk of adverse health conse
quence. See id. For example, because of their great musculature, many amateur and professional athletes
will exhibit high BMI's. Id. However, the high rates of BMI across the population as a whole do not
reflect such athletic body types, indeed, they reflect the opposite. See Broken Scales, supra note 6, at
1675-88 (reviewing scientific findings concerning the scope, causes, and consequences of the obesity
epidemic).
9 National Heart Lung and Blood Institute Obesity Education Initiative, http://www.nhlbi.nih.
gov/healthlpublic/heartlobesityllose_wtfrisk.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
_
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creased life expectancy.1 O The effect is so staggering and widespread that
researchers are now predicting a general reversal of the long-term trend of
human life expectancy increasing with each passing generation.11 The eco
nomic costs are also enormous, with an estimated

$93 billion expended

annually on health care in connection with the epidemic, half of which is
accounted for by publicly funded health care programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid.12
There is no simple solution to the obesity epidemic. The problem is
polygenetic-stemming

from

many

overlapping

sources-including

changed patterns of work and recreation, involving less continuous physical
exertion and fewer calories burned, and changed patterns of food consump
tion, involving more frequent consumption of highly caloric foods, in larger
portions.1 3 Because there is no single cause of the obesity epidemic, solu
tions to the problem are unlikely to be simple or singular in nature. Absent
the appearance of some

deus ex machina, such as a broadly effective anti

weight-gain pill with few side effects, which does not appear likely, reme
dies to this enormous social problem are going to have come from many
angles and disciplines.14 The question that motivates the present inquiry is
this: What aid can legal analysis provide to understanding and solving this
social problem?

10 See Kenneth F. Adams et aI., Ove nveight, Obesity, and Mortality in a Large Cohort of Persons
50-71 Years Old, 355 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 763, 766 (2006) (in a study of more than 500,000 members of

AARP, finding increased risk of death to baby boomers who are even modestly overweight, and sub
stantially increased risk of death for the obese); Sun Ha lee et aI., Body-Mass Index and Mortality in
Korean Men and Women, 355 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 779, 784 (2006) (finding increase in mortality risk
among the overweight in Korea).
I I Stuart 1. Olshansky et aI., A Potential Decline in life Expectancy in the United States in the
21st Century, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1138, 1140-41 (2005). Cj. Christopher J. L. Murray et aI., Eight
Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities Across Races, Counties, and Race-Counties in the United
States 3 PLoS MED. 1513, 1522 (2006), http://medicine.plosjournals.orglarchivelI 549-1676/3/9/pdflIO.

137Ijournal.pmed.0030260-L.pdf (finding significant disparities between members of the same racial
background who live in different social and geographic contexts of the United States and concluding
that differences in alcohol and tobacco use, blood pressure, cholesterol and obesity were the most sig
nificant factors behind the disparities).
12 Eric A. Finkelstein et aI., National Medical Spending Attributable to Ovenveight and Obesity:
How Much, and Who's Paying?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May 14, 2003, http://content.healthaffairs.orglcgi/
con tentlfulIlhlthaff.w3.219v I !DC I.
13 Press Release, National Center for Health Statistics, Obesity Still a Major Problem (Apr. 14,
2006), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressrooml06factslobesity03_04.htm; see Broken Scales, supra note 6,
at 1675-88 (describing polygenetic nature of the obesity epidemic).
1 4 See M.A. Cawthorne, Opportunities and Challenges for the Development of Pharmacological
Therapies for Obesity Treatment, 8 OBESITY REVIEWS 131, 135 (2007) (concluding that it is unlikely
that comprehensive pharmaceutical remedies to the obesity problem will be available in the next ten
years).
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The Analytic Problem: A Critical Realist Overview
It is important to note that this inquiry is concerned with solving the

obesity problem as it relates not just to children but to adults as well. There
has been some real progress in developing arguments for regulating the
food market as it relates to children, and policy responses built on these
arguments are beginning to be deployed.ls But the focus on children is
overemphasized; it is at least insufficient. Focusing only on children writes
off much of the contemporary adolescent and adult population to obesity
related disease and premature death; legal analysts should not be resigned
to rest easy with this result.
At one level it may seem strange, even silly, to attribute the obesity ep
idemic to anything other than the fact that people' are eating too much and
exercising too little. The epidemic may indeed be polygenetic, but it is dif
ficult to see either responsibility or remedy lying anywhere other than with
the overweight and obese themselves. After all, eating is something that
human beings do for themselves; nobody forces anyone else to eat. Our
own observations and intuitions clearly inform us of this truth, and it would
be absurd to deny it. Yet if we resolve to see others and ourselves not by the
flare of intuition alone, but more fully in the light of social science, among
the first things that we learn is that our intuitions and common sense often
betray US. 1 6 They do so in particular with respect to our assessment of the
sources of our own and others' behaviorY Indeed, our intuitions and obser
vations often leave us with an assessment of influences on human behavior
that is not only incomplete, but misleading. IS

As I have emphasized in previous work on critical realism-a princi
ple finding from many related fields of social, cognitive, neural, and behav
ioral psychology-is that our intuitions and observations, together with

1 5 For example, under pressure from increased media attention, threatened litigation, and possible

regulatory response from state and local governments, beverage companies have agreed to a phased
elimination of the sweetened beverages, as well as sugary and fried snacks,from schools. Marian Burros
& Melanie Warner, Bottlers Agree to a School Ban on Sweet Drinks, N.Y. TiMES, May 4,2006, at AI.
Connecticut has banned the sale of all soft drinks in its schools, as has New York City. Id. United States
Senator Tom Harkin, Democrat of Iowa, has attracted bi-partisan support for his Child Nutrition Promo
tion and School Lunch Protection Act, which would authorize the updating of federal nutrition guide
lines to ban from schools food with minimal nutritional value. S. 771, 110th Congo (2007). See gener
ally, C. M. Doak et. aI., The Prevention of Overweight and Obesity in Children and Adolescents: A
Review of Interventions and Programmes, 7 OBESITY REVIEWS I I I, 125-29 (2006) (providing compre
hensive assessment of obesity policies directed at children). My point is certainly not that the childhood
obesity epidemic has been solved-it has not been-but rather to emphasize the absence of conceptual
and programmatic work regarding obesity with respect to anyone but children, and thus the absence of
adequate analysis of the epidemic in its true scope and scale.
1 6 The Situational Character, supra note 6,at 23-35.
1 7 Id.
18 Id.
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deeply laden psychological motivations, lead us to attribute behavior large
ly to the dispositions of individuals (privately ordered preferences, interests,
and intentions), to the exclusion of appreciating the powerful part that ex
ternal situation plays in influencing human behavior.19 Situational influ
ences tend to be opaque to our conscious thinking about the sources of our
choices.20 Many names in different literatures describe this core insight, and
often refer to it as "the fundamental attribution error" or "dispositionism."21
Critical realism contends that attending to the biases of dispositionism
should be a central point of departure for legal theory concerned with ad
dressing all of what we are as human beings, rather than just what we ap
pear to be to others and ourselves.22
One of the reasons it is so important for legal theory and social policy
to develop a deeper perspective on the sources of human behavior is that
other powerful institutions in our society already have.23 Corporations, op
erating in a legal regime that facilitates their aggregation of capital, and
insists on their pursuit of maximum profits for shareholders, have both the
power and the incentive to discern and exploit this obscure but potent as
pect of human reality.24 Undoubtedly firms can profit by exercising situ
ational influence over consumer behavior and decision-making.25 One
would thus expect profit-oriented firms to endeavor to do SO.26 Moreover, in
robust markets, one should expect competitive pressures to push firms in
the direction of exploiting opportunities to exercise situational manipulation
of consumer behavior, even where individual firm managers are ignorant of
the manipulative nature of the practices. The market will reward firms that
move in this direction, or even that stumble accidentally into it, while pun
ishing with losses, takeover, or failure firms that fail to do SO.27 Critical real
ism refers to this process as "power economics,"28 and calls the result "mar
ket manipulation."29
These broad predictions are well evidenced by the behavior of corpo
rations operating in various consumer markets for food. In previous work, I

19

The Situation, supra note 6, at 165-66.
20 The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 23-24.
2 1 The Situation, supra note 6, at 136-37 & n.20; see generally The Situational Character, supra

note 6 (developing the theory of dispositionism).
22 See The Situation, supra note 6, at \79-83.
23 E.g., Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1689-91 (explaining how corporations have benefited from
promoting dispositionism).
24 [d. at 1689; The Situation, supra note 6, at 179-83.
25 The Situation, supra note 6, at 179.
26 [d. at 198.
27 [d. at 197.
28 Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1689; The Situation, supra note 6, at 197-201.
29 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.V. L. REv. 630, 724-27 (1999) (analyzing the problem of market manipu
lation).
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have elaborated upon the critical but often underappreciated part that the
food industry has played in contributing to the obesity epidemic.30 This Ar
ticle offers a brief summary as a necessary background to the analysis that
follows. Readers skeptical about some of the following claims are urged to
tum to previously published examinations for fuller evidenceY
First, it i s important to appreciate that eating behavior appears to be a
particularly grievous case of human behavior that our common sense, intui
tion, and observations tend to misconstrue.32 For example, while most of us
understand the subjective experience of hunger as a signal of the body' s
imminent need for food, scientists have demonstrated that the experience of
hunger and the body's need for energy are largely unrelated in the short
term. The symptoms that we often implicitly interpret as a need for food,
such

as

a palpable drop in our blood sugar, are actually the body anticipat

ing and preparing to receive food in conjunction with habitual eating pat
terns.33 There are many other examples of surprising disparities between the
way we think about our eating behavior and the reality of our eating behav
ior. In our dispositionism, most of us would think that our own subjective
hunger, preferences for types and amount of food, and subjective experi
ence of being full largely determine the amount of food we will consume in
a given feeding.34 Yet we endow such dispositions with more power than in
truth they have, and fai l to appreciate the influence of situation on how
much we eat. Studies have shown that the physical experience of satiety
that results in a cessation of feeding is correlated with the amount of food
that is in front of the person eating.35 In fact, our eating systems are gener
ally oriented towards consuming highly caloric foods in amounts far greater
than our short-term needs whenever such food is available.36 These disjunc
tions between our intuitions and the reality of our eating systems functioned
as a kind of noble lie throughout the eons of human history during which
periodic food scarcity was a real threat, which could be overcome by the

30 See generally Broken Scales, supra note 6; David G. Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The
Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk Food Advenising to Children, 39 loY. L.A. L. REv. 507 (2006)

(providing a critical realist examination of the wisdom and constitutional viability of a broad ban on
junk food advertising).
3 1 See supra text accompanying note 30 and sources cited therein.
32 See Yosifon, supra note 30 at 516-17; Broken Scales, supra note 6 at 1675-88.
33 See Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1678-84.
34 /d. at 1682-84.
35 In one study, for example, subjects were seen to eat 30% more when served large portions than
when served smaller portions. Barbara J. Rolls et aI., Ponion Size of Food Affects Energy Intake in
Normal-Weight and Overweight Men and Women, 76 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1207, 1207, 1211
(2002), cited in Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1696 & n.165. ''The finding that the ratings of hunger
and fullness after the meal did not vary, although intake increased with the amount of food that was
presented, suggests that portion size influences the development of hunger and satiety." Id.
36
Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1677-78.
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stores of fat accumulated during times of food availability.37 Food con
sumption behavior is thus far more related to the situational influence of
food availability, and less related to individual disposition than our com
mon sense leads us to believe.38
Even as we natural persons entertain a dispositional conception of eat
ing behavior, there is substantial evidence that market actors have discerned
and exploited the situational reality of the matter.39 Firms have accom
plished this in numerous ways. One important approach advanced espe
cially by j unk food and fast food fIrms has been to make highly caloric food
ubiquitously available to consumers in nearly all areas of the lived envi
ronment-in schools, at work, on the highway, at the gas station, in the
shopping malls, at sports stadiums.40 This expansion of food purveyance has
paralleled the rise in overweight and obesity in our society. A dispositionist
might aver that such purveyance merely represents market actors respond
ing to and serving pre-existing consumer preferences, but the reality is that
the external food situation shapes consumer eating behavior in ways con
sumers do not anticipate or appreciate.4 1
Another key method of situational influence deployed by food compa
nies is marketing. Even a cursory examination of major fast food compa
nies' advertising campaigns, such as Taco Bell' s promotion of the "Fourth
Meal" (which the fIrm describes as "The Meal Between Dinner and Break
fast")42 or the same company' s promotion of the view that one has not con
sumed enough food in a meal until they are able to bellow "I' m Full!,"43
suggests that such promotional efforts are oriented towards exploiting, cer
tainly not ameliorating, lay misconceptions about human eating. Other junk
food and fast food advertisements generally associate the consumption of
highly caloric, low-nutrition foods with health, vitality, sexuality, and hap
piness.44 This kind of advertising is widespread, and the dramatic increases
in overweight and obesity in the last several decades have tracked just as
dramatic a rise in such marketing efforts.45 Most of this kind of marketing is
insulated from any kind of legal action based on notions of false or mislead
ing advertising by the dubious doctrine of "puffery," which holds that gen
eral "bluster" and "boasting" in advertising is unactionable because no rea-

37
38
39
40
41
42
43

[d.
[d.
[d. at 1693-94.
[d.
[d. at 1694-95.
See Taco Bell,http://www.tacobell.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
[d.
44 See Yosifon, supra note 3031, at 520-25 (reviewing the ubiquity and influence of junk food
advertising to children); see also Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1694-1707 (providing an overview of

food marketing efforts).
45 See Yosifon,supra note 30, at 520-21.
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sonable person would be influenced by such claims.46 Scholars from many
disciplines have convincingly argued that the "puffery" doctrine is psycho
logically naIve; indeed, it is based on a highly dispositionist notion of hu
man decision-making and behavior.47 Much of what traditionally counts as
puffery does in fact influence consumers, but this has not undercut the au
thority of the doctrine before courts and regulatory agencies.48
A particularly important kind of influence that firms exercise through
marketing and lobbying is a widespread effort to promote to consumers and
regulators a particular conception of consumer behavior, one which reso
nates with and deepens our dispositionism while further obscuring our ap
preciation of situational influences on eating behavior.49 Thus, even while
food offerings, portions, and promotions influence consumers in ways they
do not appreciate, firms assure both consumers and regulators that consum
ers are merely being provided with choices, and thus that if there is an obe
sity problem it is a problem of personal responsibility, not a fai lure of pub
lic policy.50 Critical realism refers to this process as "deep capture."5 1 Deep
capture serves

as

a crucial correlate to, and explanation of, the notion that

firms endeavor to "capture" regulatory institutions charged with watching
over industry conduct.52 The success of such efforts is clearly evident in the
obesity context.53 For example, twenty-three state legislatures have already
passed such so-called "hamburger bills," formally insulating food compa
nies from liability for the overweight and obesity-related harms connected
with the consumption of their products. 54 Such efforts have also spurred
federal legislation, such as the proposed "Personal Responsibility in Food

46 See id.

at 530-31; see also David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REv.
1395, 1400 (2006); Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other 'Loophole' Claims: How the Law's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 72-73 (1998).
47 Yosifon, supra note 30, at 537.
48 Id. at 533-37.
49
See Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1728-43.
50 Id. at 1733.
5 1 The Situation, supra note 6, at 218 states:
By "deep capture," then, we are referring to the disproportionate and self-serving influence
that the relatively powerful tend to exert over all the exterior and interior situational features
that materially influence the maintenance and extension of that power- including those fea
tures that purport to be, and that we experience as, independent, volitional, and benign.

Id.

52 Id. at 229-35.
53 See Broken Scales, supra

note

6,

at

1691-1707, 1720-21, 1734-57

(analyzing industry conduct

with respect to the obesity epidemic).

54 David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing Congress's Re
sponse to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 357, 365 (2007); see also Broken Scales,
supra note 6, at 1776-1781 (discussing these legislative efforts).
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Consumption Act," which would provide finns federal protection from li
ability.55
This brief discussion of consumer and corporate behavior has been in
tended only to illuminate an important aspect of the obesity epidemic that
must be addressed in any satisfying legal analysis of the problem.

II.

CONVENTIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Conventional law and economics is not up to the analytic challenge

posed by the obesity epidemic. Richard Epstein's recent article on the obe
sity problem exemplifies well the basic law and economics approach to
legal analysis, as well as that approach' s flaws.56 After referencing statistics
on the scale of the of the obesity epidemic roughly as depicted above,57 Ep
stein concludes that present uses of "taxation scheme[s]," "programs of
regulation," "systems of liability," and even "education program[s]" are

all

already "exhausted" in tenns of what may usefully be done with them in
response to the obesity epidemic.58 "[F]urther interventions," he determines,
"are likely to be both costly and counterproductive."s9 This is a striking
assessment: that

no further contribution to the amelioration of this enor

mous and still growing social problem can be had from any alteration of
these fundamental mechanisms of social organization.
And yet, while striking, it is not at all unexpected. Epstein is merely
keeping true to the general law and economics view that where markets
appear to be operating in a robust and competitive fashion, regulation is
likely to be inefficient, and make us all worse-off.60 The rational actor mod
el at the heart of the conventional law and economics approach inexorably
leads to this kind of conclusion. Rational actors bring their own privately
ordered, stable preferences with them to different behavioral and decision-

55 Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1777 & n.9 (citing H.R. 339, 108th Congo (2003) (protecting
"[tlhe manufacturer, distributor, or seller of a food or non-alcoholic beverage product intended for
human consumption" from state and federal civil liability».
56 See generally Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) To Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian
Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361 (2005). Despite the title,the work takes a straightforward law and economics
approach-it is clearly not Epstein's purpose to undertake an Aristotelian analysis of the obesity prob
lem. Instead, the title is meant to ring true with the maxim "moderation is all things" as a the best ap
proach to the obesity problem (though as he means it, "all things" applies only to human behavior-as
stated in the text,he urges government to do nothing, and there is nothing that he urges food corpora
tions to stop doing). Id. at 1366.
57 Epstein,supra note 56, at 1361; see supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
5 8 Epstein, supra note 56,at 1374-75.
59 [d.
60 See The Situation, supra note 6, at 159-65 (analyzing the limited parameters of policy analysis

within the economic analysis of law).
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making circumstances.61 They accumulate and process information in such
a manner as will enable them to maximize the satisfaction of their prefer
ences through the behaviors and decisions they engage.62 Those behaviors
and decisions that actors actually make reveal and express to the rest of the
world, including policymakers, what the actors' preferences were, and are.63
Market actors, such as profit-maximizing corporations, have the incentive
to discern and respond to those preferences, lest other firms do so in their
stead.64 Robust markets thus serve consumer interests by making it more
likely that their preferences will be satisfied at competitive prices.65 In this
script, the market is agent to the consumer, and profits, so long as they are
taken in competitive markets, are the consummate sign of consumer satis
faction.66 Indeed, this story of consumer preference satisfaction is a crucial
justification in back of the profit-maximization principle at the heart of con
temporary corporate lawY Regulatory "intervention" can only muck up the
simple elegance and felicitous results of such market transactions .68 Striving
outside of the disciplining contours of the market, regulators are likely to
produce outcomes that are worse than even imperfect market outcomes .69
Indeed, regulators may not even be genuinely motivated by the public inter
ested at all, but rather may pursue their own personal or ideological inter
ests in their regulatory efforts.70 Deploying this script in the obesity context,

61

See, e.g Tanina Rostain, Educating Honw Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behav
ioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 L. & SOC'Y REV. 973, 976-77 (2000) (compiling citations to
sources espousing this view).
62 See, e.g., id. at 977.
63 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
.•

and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1 47 1 , 1475 ( 1 998) [hereinafter A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics] (noting that conventional economic analysis focuses on "social welfare," which is measured
and maximized by their preferences as revealed in the market).
64 The Situation, supra note 6, at 197-20 1 , 225-26.
65 See, e.g., John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1 1 39, 1 149 ( 1 990) (not
ing that "voluntary transactions by individuals acting in free, competitive markets best served consum
ers' interests" because such transactions allow individuals to satisfy their preferences). A transaction
will not be voluntary unless at a competiti ve price. [d.
66 See, e.g., Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Comnwns and the Myth of the Private Property
Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 533, 542 (2007) (describing such a relationship between producer profits
and consumer satisfaction as "producti ve efficiency").
67 The Situation, supra notc 6, at 1 99 n.254; see also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of
Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modem Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. I, 83-84
(2004). See also infra Part IV (examining the propriety of the profit-maximization rule for firms operat
ing in the food market).
68 See The Situation, supra note 6, at 227-28.
69

See id.
70 See id. at 203-06 (discussing the development of the theory of regulatory capture); see id. at
227-28 (noting that regulators have their own concerns about job security and career advancement and
may be attempting to impose their personal vision of an orderly society rather than serving the public
interest).
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Epstein finds it relatively easy to conclude that "the sound background pre
sumption against government intervention has not been overcome."71
Epstein does propose one policy response to the obesity epidemic. He
suggests that perhaps those suffering from overweight or obesity should be
dropped from insurance rolls, such that they will no longer be able to exter
nalize the cost of their condition to everyone else:
If

we let insurers and employers have the right to draw distinctions on the grounds of weight
. . . then the cross subsidy problem will be largely eliminated because each person's rate will
depend more on individual performance and not on the performance of others. The prices
will not only change the distribution of burdens, but should create incentives to reduce the to
tal size of the problem . . . . It is only when universal access is the cardinal principle of health
care that markets are sure to fail. 72
This macabre suggestion, that the best thing policymakers can do to

help with the obesity epidemic is to isolate the obese and leave them to their
own devices, again follows inevitably from the basic legal economist script.
Epstein assumes that people' s food consumption will shift towards optimal
once they can no longer externalize the health costs associated with con
sumption, because consuming to the point where the costs to

oneself is

greater than the gains to oneself would be irrational, and the abiding, un
criticized presumption is that people are rational actors who maximize their
own utility.
Now, it turns out, of course, that "universal access" is not presently the
"cardinal principle" with respect to health insurance coverage in the United
States. Indeed, at least

33 million American adults have no health insurance

at alp3 And it further turns out that those without insurance are suffering
from untreated obesity related illnesses at higher rates than are their insured
counterparts, exactly the opposite of what one would expect following the

logic of Epstein's cost externalization argument. 74 It is the falsity of the

71
72

Epstein, supra note 56, at 1364.
Epstein, supra note 56, at 1369; see also, Jayanta Bhattacharya & Neeraj Sood, Health Insur
ance and the Obesity Externality 2, 26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W1l529,
2(05), http://www.nber.org/papers/wI1529 (deploying the basic rational actor model in a conventional
economic analysis of cost externalization in the obesity epidemic and concluding that "as long as insur
ance premiums are not risk related for obesity, health insurance coverage systematically shields those
covered from the full costs of physical inactivity and overeating . . . . These reduced incentives lead to
inefficient increases in body weight, and reduced social welfare.").
73 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, & Jessica Smith, Income, Poverty, and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2006, 27 fig. 6 (Aug. 2(07), http://www.census.gov/ (follow
"People and Households: Health Insurance " hyperlink; then follow "Health Insurance Coverage: 2006"
hyperlink; then follow "Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States:2006"
hyperlink).
74 See John Z. Ayanian et aI., Unmet Health Needs of Uninsured Adults in the United States, 284
J. AMER MED. ASS'N 2061, 2061 (2000) (finding much greater unmet health needs, including treatment
of obesity, among the uninsured than among the insured); see also Jennifer S. Haas et aI., The Associa-
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classic rational actor model and its inability to grapple with the complex
conception of human agency developing in the social sciences that leads to
the errors witnessed here. 75 Indeed, insurance companies already routinely
exclude coverage for the treatment of overweight and obesity, which is fur
ther evidence that Epstein's prescription is unlikely to seriously address the
obesity problem currently being witnessed in our society.76 Epstein's argu
ment, that the obesity crisis may be ameliorated by relying on unrealistic
rational-actor-like behavioral responses to the upending of a predicate that
clearly does not exist (universal coverage and universal pooling), might be
described as embracing an illusion within a delusion.
Law and economics stalwart Richard Posner has also written on the
obesity epidemic, and has reached conclusions similar to Epstein. Posner
even ups the ante on Epstein's claim that there is nothing government can
do to improve on obesity matters-for Posner, there is no obesity crisis. For
example, he states that "in a model of human behavior in which people are
assumed to be rational actors, there is no such thing as being overweight. A
person's weight is the result of personal choices along such dimensions as
occupation, leisure-time activity or inactivity, residence and, of course,
food intake. 77 This claim begins a frequently cited paper by Posner dedi
cated to constructing a formal economic model reflecting such a characteri
zation of the obesity epidemic.78 More recently, on his blog wi�h Nobel

tion of Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health Insurance Status with the Prevalence of Overweight
Among Children and Adolescents, 93 AMER. I. PuB. HEALTH 2105, 2107 (2003) ("[L]ack of health
insurance is positively associated with the prevalence of overweight among adolescents."). The insur
ance externality or "moral hazard" problem of pooling risk-takers with non-risk takers, a familiar law
and economics prediction, has also been proved wrong in the case of smoking. One study tracking
changes in smoking status over a seven-year period found that those without health insurance were

more

likely to smoke than were their insured counterparts, the opposite of what a conventional economic
analysis would predict. Catarina I. Kiefe et aI., Health Care Access and Seven-Year Change in Cigarette
Smokin g, 15 AM. I. PREv. MED. 146, 146 (1998); see also Ion D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First
Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. RE V.

129, 189-90 (1990) (arguing

that in many circumstances enterprise liability will be a more efficient

response to first-party insurance externalities than would be insurance pool segregation). Below

I

will

return to a consideration of this correlation between health insurance and obesity rates, suggesting how
law and behavioralism can help explain it. See

75

infra

text accompanying notes

147-156.

Indeed, Epstein's claim that it is only when universal coveragc is guaranteed that markets

are

certain to fail, does not even, as a matter of logic, lead to the conclusion that market's are certain to
succeed where universal coverage is not guaranteed. It is only once the behavioral assumptions backing
the rational actor model are taken as major premises that such a conclusion follows.

76 See Louis F. Martin et aI., Socioeconomic Issues Affectin g the Treatment of Obesity in the New
Millennium, 18 PHARMACOECONOMICS 335, 337 (2000).
77 See Tomas I. Phillipson & Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity As a Function
of Technological Ch an ge, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED S87, S88 (2003).
78 As of Feb. 8, 2008, the Posner's article, supra note 77, has been downloaded 1,096 times from
SSRN.
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Prize winning economist Gary Becker, Posner pans regulatory "interven
tion"to curb the epidemic:

[Sjuch measures are from an economic standpoint justifiable only if the growth in obesity
represents a market failure . . . . It is possible that being fatter than doctors think healthy is
optimal . . . . People trade off health costs for benefits in other currencies; food high in calo
ries tends to be both delicious and cheap. The health effects of [being] overweight are highly
publicized. In addition, in our society fat people are generally considered much less attractive
than thin people, and there is a considerable premium in the job market for attractive people .
. . . Given all the negatives of [being] overweight, it is difficult to believe that obese people
have underestimated the costs of being overweight . . . . The main costs of obesity . . . are
borne by the obese themselves, which greatly weakens the economic case for intervention?9
There is no need for "intervention"because there is no market failure;
therefore, while there may be obesity, there is no obesity problem. But the
"economic case for intervention"is only "weaken[ed)"by virtue of the fact
that the obese bear the costs of their condition themselves if it turns out that
it is not just "possible," the proposition Posner begins with, but that it is

actually true, the conclusion he seems to end with, that "being fatter .. . is

optimal."80 That is, the obese really have chosen their condition from
among a set of privately ordered preferences. 18 We can see the fundamental
law and economics leap of faith between the supposition and the conclu

sion. The exegesis he actually makes between the two would seem to be
more an argument that if people were rational they would not be fat, rather
than an argument that people are fat because they are rational. Yet Posner
concludes that for fat people the benefits of their condition must outweigh
the burdens. The only thing that holds this argument together is the back
ground presumption, unexamined, that people's choices reveal their prefer
ences, and that no other influences are essential to the analysis. Posner's
belief in the integrity of market outcomes in this context rests entirely on
his faith in the rational actor. 2
8
79 Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.coml
archivesl2005/12/advertisinILand.htrnl (Dec. 11, 2005, 06:22PM).

80 Id.
8 1 [d.
82 There is little evidence that people appreciate the health consequences of food consumption

behavior, and growing evidence that people do not. One study found that 40% of overweight/obese
wives and 45% of overweight/obese fathers did not consider themselves overweight or obese. A.N.
Jeffrey et aI., Parents' Awareness of Overweight in Themselves and Their Children, 330 BRIT. MED. J.
23, 23 (2005). Studies also indicate that people tend to fail to recognize that their own children are
overweight; in one study, only 36% of parents of overweight children described their children as being
overweight. Kathryn C. Eckstein, Parents' Perceptions of Their Child's Weight and Health, 117
PEDIATRICS 681, 681 (2006); see also Costas Pangagopoulos, Obesity, 70 PuB. OPINION Q. 249, 251
(2006) ("Clear and growing discrepancies appear between government estimates of the degree of obe
sity and public perceptions about personal weight . . . . It would be safe to say that Americans' percep
tions of their weight are different from reality."). Many people also have difficulty interpreting food
labels. See generally Russell L. Rothman et aI., Patient Understanding of Food Labels: The Role of
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It is no doubt "difficult t o believe," as Posner writes,83 that something
other than preference-driven choices are important in accounting for con
sumer behavior in the obesity epidemic. Yet the reason that it is so difficult
relates more to the strength of our intuitions about the dispositional sources
of our own and other people's behavior, than it does to the actual strength
of arguments and evidence that environmental factors, including market
manipulation, are important in analyzing the obesity epidemic.84 Once the
pre-commitment to intuition-based reasoning is suspended, and social sci
ence enters to aid the analysis of the underlying question of human agency,
then it becomes easier to see, and easier to believe, that obesity

does repre

sent a market failure in need of remedy.
Yet it is important to emphasize the consonance between the law and
economics approach to the obesity problem, exemplified here by Epstein
and Posner, and popular resistance to a robust regulatory response to it. 85
The rational actor model, far from being an unfamiliar abstraction, is actu
ally a simple reflection of intuitive, common-sense conceptions of the
sources of human behavior. As reviewed above, all humans, to greater or
lesser degrees, tend to view both their own and other people's behaviors as
the manifestation of individual preferences, and they fail to appreciate the
ways in which situation influences behaviors and decisions.86 It is the mani
festation of informal ways of thinking about human behavior in the formal
exegeses of law and economics analysis, and not scientific rigor, which is
the source of the persuasive power that the economic approach enjoys in
legal analysis and policymaking. While law and economics makes claims to
being scientific, its starting assumptions about the driving forces behind
human behavior are based on the same unexamined intuitions that stand in
back of a shared common sense which turns out to be wrong in crucial
ways.87 In Epstein and Posner, two highly influential thinkers, we have seen
the first evidence of the persuasive but misleading power of dispositionism
operating in legal theoretic assessment of the obesity epidemic. As we shall

Literacy and Numeracy, 31 AM. J. PREV.

MED.

391, 394 (2006)

(finding that food label literacy highly

correlates with underlying literacy but that "even patients with higher levels of education can struggle to
interpret current food labels.") Earlier,
text accompanying notes

8-12;

I cited the

life-expectancy losses associated with obesity,

supra

a presumption of optimality would have to encompass not only that

reality but also the effects of obesity on quality of life before demise, such as hypertension, depression,
sexual dysfunction, and discrimination. While the Centers for Disease Control estimates that
Americans have cancer,

15%

problem facing the country, with just

9%

84

of

considering obesity to be the most important, despite the fact

that overweight and obesity rates among adults are today

supra at 250, 256.
83 Supra text

7%

of survey respondents considered cancer to be the most urgent health

accompanying note

60%

and

30%

respectively. Pangopolous,

79.

See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
85 See infra text accompanying notes 231-33 (discussing public opinion on the obesity epidemic).
86 See generally The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 37-85 (reviewing studies).
87 See id. at 138-52 (elaborating this claim).
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see, this problem persists even in purportedly advanced versions of the ba
sic economic approach.

m.

BEHA VIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS AND OBESITY EPIDEMIC
ANALYSIS

A.

The Behavioral Challenge and the Rise of Libertarian Paternalism
Legal scholars have challenged mainstream law and economics for

decades. Critical legal scholars, feminist legal scholars, critical race theo
rists, and others launched early assaults from outside of the economic tradi
tion.88 In the last decade, scholars working to expand or explode the con
ventional economic model from within have advanced a distinct second
wave of criticism using the same basic terms and adhering to the same basic
purposes as the economic approach.89 This second wave has been commit
ted to advancing its critique by exploiting insights from behavioral science,
in particular social, cognitive, and behavioral psychology.90 These scholars
have dubbed their movement "behavioral law and economics."91 Their work
is becoming increasingly influential in legal scholarship,92 posing a signifi
cant challenge to more conventional economic approaches, and drawing the
attention of scholars working outside of economic analysis altogether.93
This Section briefly introduces behavioral law and economics and then ar
gues that the most recent developments in this legal theoretic movement
offer no more satisfying an approach to the legal analysis of the obesity
epidemic than does the conventional law and economics paradigm that it
seeks to replace.

88 See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 114-85 (1987);
see also The Situation, supra note 6, at 140-42 (collecting references to decades of criticism of law and

economics from numerous kinds of legal scholars).
89 See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Eco
nomics, 56 V AND. L. REv. 1663 (2003).
90 See Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 882 (2007)
(behavioral law and economics "draws its inspiration . . . from the empirical findings generated by
behavioral psychology, cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and related
fields.").
9 1 A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63, at 1476-89 (describing and
defining "behavioral law and economics").
92 Cf Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe, & Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 S. CT.
EcON. REv. 35, 42 (2005) ("[Blehavioral law and economics has also become very influential in legal
scholarship.").
93 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Marks, 9/// + 3/// + 717
? What Counts in Counterterrorism, 37
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559 (2006) (applying behavioral law and economics to counterterrorism).
=
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The behavioral law and economics critique begins by emphasizing the
divergence between the "rational actor" model94 and the picture of human
decision-making that has emerged within social psychology, cognitive psy
chology, and allied disciplines.95 It turns out that humans do not consis
tently make rationally optimal decisions; indeed, in some decision-making
contexts we consistently make sub-optimal decisions. S ocial psychologists
and other social scientists have conducted hundreds of experiments that
richly demonstrate this fact.96
Most behavioral law and economics literature is dedicated to catalog
ing and examining the implications of particular findings of specific depar
tures from the rational actor model.97 A number of specific kinds of
"anomalies" have become familiar in legal scholarship. For example, social
psychologists have demonstrated that humans are subject to what has been
deemed an "endowment effect," such that we tend automatically to value
something more if we have it or are endowed with a right to it, while valu
ing that same thing less if we do not already have or are not entitled to it.98
This phenomenon is usually presented in legal academic literature with
reference to what is quickly becoming a favorite old chestnut (or at least an
agreeable retread), the Cornell coffee mug experiment. 99 Cornell coffee
mugs were randomly distributed to half of a group of students. The students
who were endowed with the mug were then asked to specify a price they
would require in order to sell their mug to a student without one, while the
students without mugs were asked to specify a price they would be willing
to pay to buy a mug from a student with one. Students who were endowed
with the mugs specified a price that was roughly twice what students who
were not endowed with a mug were willing to pay for one. Absent the en
dowment effect, one would have expected different valuations of the mugs
to have been distributed randomly among students, but by operation of the
endowment effect, students who had the mugs predictably valued them

94 A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra

note

91, at 1476 ("The task of behavioral

law and economics simply state d is to explore the impli cations of actual (not hypothesized) human
behavior for the law. How do "real people" differ from homo economi cus.").

95 Id.

at

1476-89

(describ ing behavior law and economics as the product of bounded rationality,

bounde d will-power, and bounded self- interest and asserting that "[alII three bounds

are

well

doc umented in the literature of other social sciences").

96

For comprehensive summaries of relevant social scientifi c literature, see generally The Situ
ational Character, supra note 6; A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63; Hanson
& Kysar, supra note 29.
97 See, e.g., Michael A. McCann, It's Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive

Biases, and Heuristics among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1459 (2006).
98 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate
Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002).
99 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion. and Status Quo Bias. 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193. 195-97 (1991).
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more than those who did not. IOO The coffee mug experiment is a simple il
lustration of a broadly influential tendency in human thinking. The implica
tions of the endowment effect, however, become both complicated and im
portant when one considers that by its operation humans may value many
kinds of interests (e.g. , property rights or civil rights) differently if such
rights are construed as something they already have, and might give up for
a price, or as something they do not have, but might acquire at a price.10 1
The reality of the endowment effect certainly undermines a key feature of
the "rational actor" model: the presumption that people endeavor to maxi
mize a set of privately ordered preferences. What people endeavor to maxi
mize, it turns out, depends upon a key situational factor-the distribution of
entitlements.
There are many examples of this kind of phenomena. Another familiar

getting yearly breast
increase their chances of surviving breast cancer, far fewer

study is one demonstrating that if women are told that
exams will

women will actually get the breast exams than would if they were told that

failing to get yearly breast example will decrease their chances of surviving

breast cancer.102 The breast cancer study exemplifies the impact of both
loss-aversion and framing effects. Both effects are important deviations
from the conventional rational actor model of decision-making. People tend
to dislike losses more than they enjoy gains; in economic terms, they would
be willing to pay more to reduce their chances of losses than they would be
willing to pay for a similar increase in their chances of achieving gains.

Where breast cancer exams are framed as loss avoidance, more women will
reveal a "preference" for breast exams than where breast exams are framed
as a "gain" with respect to the chances of surviving breast cancer.I03
Many other "anomalies" of this nature have been identified by social
scientists and put to use in behavioral law and economics.I04 In an important
early riposte to the behavioral law and economics challenge, Judge Posner
\ 00 [d. at 195-97.
\0\ Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1227, 1228
(2003) (assessing use of the endowment effect in legal scholarship).
\ 02 See Tracy Williams et aI., Effects of Message Framing on Breast-Cancer-Related Beliefs and
Behaviors: The Role of Mediating Factors, 3 1 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 925, 931 -32, 938 (2001).
\03 See The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 37-44 (describing further studies that illustrate

these phenomena). Status quo bias, risk aversion, and framing effects are all recurring themes in the
behavioral law and economics literature. E.g., Daniel Kahneman et aI., The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON . PERSP. 1 93 ( 1 99 1 ). I have found the breast cancer example to
be an especially powerful way of describing this aspect of the basic behavioral critique to students.
Nevertheless, one of my criticisms of behavioral law and economics is its tendency to focus too exclu
sively on the biases and heuristics literature and its failure to more comprehensively incorporate the
broader array of situation al influences over human thought and behavior revealed by social science,
which call for a more substantial departure from the basic law and economics model than behavioral
legal economists have accepted. See infra text accompanying notes 276-296 (developing this claim in
the obesity context).
1 04 See supra text accompanying notes 99- 1 0 1 .
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claimed that the approach was under-theorized and, indeed, was not a the
ory at all. 105 Posner argued that behavioral law and economics was little
more than a list of "quirks" which could not be deployed i n systematic crit
ical analysis. I06 The theoretical architecture of behavioral law and econom
ics is i ndeed too limited, and the approach is inapt to the kind of legal anal
ysis that must be undertaken in light of what the behavioral critique has
revealed about human behavior and decision-making. 107 In terms of frame
works for analysis, early behavioral law and economics introduced to legal
theory the construct of "bounded rationality," which might replace the "ra
tional" actor used in canonical economic analysis, giving legal theory a
more accurate picture of the limitations of human decision-making.108 The
theory also introduced the concept of "bounded self i nterest," which is
meant to provide behavioral law and economics a framework for respond
i ng to the robust findings making clear that in many circumstances people
predictably make decisions in a manner that evinces concern with values or
i nterests other than their own narrow self-interest (as the basic rational actor
model conventionally assumes). l09 Finally, behavioral law and economics
i ntroduced the notion of "bounded will power" as a way of attending to the
reality that we often find it difficult to conform our decisions and behavior
even to that which we

know to be in our own best interest. 1 10 The typical

behavioral law and economics law review article focuses on the implica
tions of one or more of these "bounded" conceptions for the economic
analysis of given doctrinal or institutional topics. l 1 l
The trouble with behavioral law and economics begins with these con
structs. They completely fail to capture the most critical lesson of the be
havioral critique, which is that human beings are far more subject to situ
ational

influence, in our thinking and in our behavior, than we anticipate or

appreciate. The three "bounds" of the behavioral law and economics ap1 05

Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and The Law, 50 STAN. L. REv.

1 55 1 , 1552, 1 559-60 ( 1 999).
106

[d. at 1 557-58. Hanson and I take issue with Posner's general defense of conventional law and
economics against the behavioral critique in The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 152-59. See
also Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler's response to Posner's critique in Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner
and Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1 593 ( 1 998) (arguing that behavioral law and economics promises pre
dict human behavior better than the conventional rational actor model does and that Posner's defense of
the rational actor model is non-falsifiable).
1 07 See infra text accompanying notes 1 26-36.
1 08 See A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63, at 1 477-78 (discussing
"bounded rationality").
1 09 See id. at 1 479 (discussing "bounded self interest").
1 1 0 See id. (defining "bounded will power").
I I I See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscion
ability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1290-95 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care
"Patient Protection " Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1 , 47-48 (1999); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market
Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REv. 482, 548-60 (2002).
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proach maintain the basic dispositional perspective at that heart of the con
ventional rational actor model. The "bounded" actor may be less capable of
discerning and pursuing her preferences (some of which might concern
people or matters other than herself), but the basic picture of an insulated,
private preference

satisfier

is

unadulterated.

What

is

absent

in

the

"bounded" approach is a way of capturing and attending to the ever-present
but unseen power of external situation, and the manipulation of external
situation, to move us and others in ways that we mistakenly attribute to
individual disposition. This limitation constrains the analytic power and
undermines the normative authority of behavioral law and economics. 1 1 2
Lately, behavioral law and economics scholars have become more
ambitious in their formulation of the theoretical implications of their pro
ject. 1 I 3 This Section focuses on recent claims concerning the normative im
plications of behavioral law and economics for longstanding debates about
"paternalism" in policymaking. This angle provides a useful vantage from
which to grasp the implications of behavioral law and economics for obe
sity epidemic analysis. Traditional law and economics has long been "anti
paternalistic" in nature, committed as it is to individual choice as the faith
ful engine of allocative efficiency. 1 14 A strong anti-paternalism was clearly
reflected in the basic law and economics assessment of the obesity problem
discussed above . 1 I 5 But the law and behavioralism movement has intro
duced a confounding new puzzle into conventional paternalism debates. In
recent work, leading behavioral legal economists Cass Sunstein and Rich
ard Thaler excellently pose that puzzle, but do not adequately solve it.
The roots of the puzzle can be traced to an earlier inquiry that S unstein
and Thaler left lingering at the end of their seminal Stanford Law Review
article (with Christine Jolls),

A Behavioral Approach to Law and Econom
ics.1I6 At the end of that piece, the authors claimed that the many psycho1 1 2 See infra text accompanying notes 1 1 5 -6 1 . There are, beyond peradventure, a wealth of in

credibly interesting and important new studies that have recently advanced our understanding of many
fundamental areas of legal inquiry by application of the concept of "bounded rationality." The studies
cited in the previous note are just the tip of the iceberg. Nevertheless, I believe that legal theory must
expand its appreciation of the behavioral critique in order to grapple with its implications more fully.
This is especially so with respect to obesity epidemic analysis, where these concepts have proved inade
quate. See infra text accompanying notes 2 1 4-30.
1 1 3 The Situational Character, supra note 6; The Situation, supra note 6.
1 1 4 Cj. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63, at 1475 ("In its normative
orientation, conventional law and economics is often strongly antipatemalistic. The idea of "consumer
sovereignty" plays a large role; citizens, assuming they have reasonable access to relevant information,
are thought to be the best judges of what will promote their own welfare.").
1 1 5 See supra text accompanying notes 56-87.
1 1 6 A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63. The Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler
article has become a touchstone, usually a starting place, for legal scholars making use of "behavioral
ism." See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (2007) (build
ing on the Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler article by adding emotional biases to the "behavioralist" analysis);
Alex Stein, A Liberal Challenge to Behavioral Economics: The Case of Probability, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. &
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logical studies referenced in their article lead to a social policy perspective
that "pushes toward a sort of anti-anti-paternalism-a skepticism about
anti-paternalism, but not an affirmative defense of paternalism."1 l 7 This was
so, the authors argued, because although evidence of "bounded rationality"
and "bounded will power" on the part of individual human actors in their
capacity as citizens or consumers might seem to counsel in favor of pater
nalistic social policies, "government actors . . . themselves may face the
same cognitive or motivational problems as everyone else."1 l 8 Because of
the supposed "wash" between the implications of the behavioral critique as
applied to consumer decision-makers in unregulated markets on the one
hand, and government regulators on the other, the paternalism q uestions
raised by the behavioral critique were shrugged off as a tie, with uncertain
implications. I 19

In their more recent effort to advance the behavioral law and econom
ics project, however, Sunstein and Thaler abandon this agnostic "anti-anti
paternalism" and introduce the concept of "libertarian paternalism," a the
ory which they argue answers the normative questions raised by the behav
ioral critique in a more decisive manner, and in a fashion that is both re
sponsive to behavioralism and palatable to anti-paternalists. 12o I argue that
"libertarian paternalism" is analytically and normatively problematic, as a
general matter, and that it fails in particular to provide a satisfactory ap
proach to legal analysis of the obesity epidemic. 121 Despite these shortcom
ings, the budding popularity of libertarian paternalism threatens to lend
unjustified intellectual support to opponents of a strong regulatory response
to the obesity epidemi c.
Sunstein and Thaler's argument begins by recognizing, as social psy
chology teaches, that the "design features" of decision-making or behav
ioral circumstances "have surprisingly powerful influences on people's
choices."122 This axiom derives from robust findings across many areas of
the social sciences, but it can be illustrated and understood quickly with
reference to specific studies like those described above.12 3 S unstein and

LIBERTY 531 , 53 1 (2007) (arguing that "behavioralism" "needs to be liberally inclusive in formulating
the criteria for rationality against which to evaluate people's cognitive ability and performance."). The
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler article is also available in a useful collection, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS ( 1 997) (Cass Sunstein, Ed.).
1 17 A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63, at 154 1 .
1 18

/d.

1 1 9 Id. at 1 546-47.
1 20 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 159, 1 1 60 (2003).
1 2 1 See infra text accompanying notes 2 14-30.
1 22 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 120, at 1 1 61 .
1 23 See supra text accompanying notes 32-55 (describing situational influence on human eating
behavior); text accompanying notes 99- 1 03 (describing the "endowment effect" and "framing effect"

studies).
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Thaler emphasize a now-famous retirement savings study in which James
Choi and his collaborators demonstrated the following: when employees are
given an employment compensation package that automatically deducts a
certain percentage of their salary and puts it in a 40 1 (k) savings plan, with
an

opt-out right not to participate in such a plan, employees participate in

the savings plan at significantly higher rates than they do when the default
is no savings-plan participation, with employees having the right to opt-in
to one at their own election.124 The savings behavior studied by Choi and
others is an example of what social psychologists call the "status quo bias,"
which is a finding that defaults alter people's "preferences"-other things
equal, given a choice between sticking with A or choosing B instead, more
people will prefer A, unless the choice is between sticking with B or choos
ing A instead, in which case more people will prefer B. This reality of hu
man decision-making is no small matter. As the savings example demon
strates, depending on the default, people will "reveal" significantly different
"preferences" for either more present consumption and less future con
sumption, or less present consumption and more future consumption.125
Sunstein and Thaler argue that findings of this nature should make it
clear to anti-paternalists that in many circumstances the "social planner"
cannot simply allow or insist that people be free to make their own choices
about what is in their best interest.126 The "social planner," it turns out, very
often cannot help but influence people's decisions through the design fea
tures structuring a given behavioral circumstance.127 Critical realism refers
to such features as "situational" influences, which, though often unseen, are
ubiquitous in human affairs.128 Facing the predicament

as

they understand it,

Sunstein and Thaler next formulate what they describe as the "libertarian
paternalist" position:

1 24

Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 20, at 1 1 59-60. The underlying study referenced by Sunstein
and Thaler is James J. Choi et aI., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Panicipant Choices, and
the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POLICY & ECON. 67 (2002).
1 25 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 29, at 673-76 (discussing the "status quo bias"). The reader
will clearly see the similarity between "status quo bias" and the "endowment effect." Many psychologi
cal mechanisms or patterns described by social psychologists are overlapping in their definition and
effect. Cj. Jamie O'Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators
Console Their Victims? 46 HARV. lNT'L L.1. 295, 307 (2005) ("Some of the effects may seem to overlap
or shade into each other because they represent therapists' and psychologists' attempts to describe com
plex psychological conditions that defy simple explanation."). The crucial point for legal analysis is that
what is common about these findings is the hard evidence they provide that we are far more subject to
influence in our cognition than we appreciate in our common sense understanding of ourselves. This is
the promising unified perspective that is missing in the behavior law and economics efforts critiqued in
the text.
1 26 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 120, at 1 1 94-95.
1 27 ld.
1 28 See generally The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 7-8, 33.
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[T]he design features of both legal and organizational rules have surprisingly powerful influ

ences on people's choices. We urge that such rules should be chosen with the explicit goal of

improving the welfare of the people affected by them. The libertarian aspect of our strategy

lies in the

straightfonvard insistence

that, in general, people should be free to opt out of spe

cified arrangements if they choose to do so. To borrow a phrase, libertarian paternalists urge
that people should be "free to choose." Hence we do not aim to defend any approach that
129

blocks individual choices.

The social planner is to orient bounded decision-makers in a maximiz
ing direction, but provide them the freedom to opt-out and go their own
way if they so desire.'30 With this formula in place, the libertarian
paternalist project is up and running, and Sustein and Thaler spend the bal
ance of their article cataloging positive law that corresponds to their vision,
and sketching the implications of their idea for policymaking in various
arenas. 1 3 1
Sunstein and Thaler' s formulation no doubt succeeds in presenting a
theory of paternalism that is at least somewhat palatable to anti-paternalists,
but it does so at the expense of analytic coherence and prescriptive power.
The central analytic problem in Sunstein and Thaler' s treatment is this: The
authors claim that in many circumstances the "social planner"

cannot avoid

shaping choice; if that is so, then how can the social planner possibly pro
vide for people to be "free to choose"? The social planner cannot avoid
shaping choice in the provision of opt-outs any more than she can in the
status quo predicament that presented the problem to begin with. Requiring
an opt-out does not present an occasion different in nature from the pre
dicament we began with, wherein choosers may now act "freely," uninflu
enced by the social planner. Sunstein and Thaler accept a crucial axiom of
decision-making theory at the initial stage of the decision-making context,
but they abandon it just as quickly when they posit by implication the exis
tence of some pure ground, or some pure moment in the choosing life of the
individual, in which people are "free to opt out of specified arrange
ments" l 32 if the individual finds that the social planner's design does not
maximize her own welfare. In truth, the opt-out condition does not satisfy
the libertarian requirement, it merely reintroduces the problem that started
the whole project: the inevitability of (often unseen) situational influence
over human choosing. Sunstein and Thaler's problem, analytically, is that
they must confront this reality at every tum,

including in the opt-out world.

The theory is not coherent; the libertarian paternalism escape hatch is a
mirage. What is pivotal about the behavioral critique is the powerful, perva
sive, and too little seen influence of situation over choice. Call this, in criti
cal realist terminology, the problem of "unbounded situation," a phrase

1 29 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 20,
1 30 See id.
1 3 l [d. at 1 1 72-95.
1 32 [d. at 1 1 6 1 .

at

1 1 61

(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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which perhaps better describes our predicament than does "bounded ration
ality. "
Consider, for example, a hypothetical employee savings program. The
"social planner" knows that she cannot avoid influencing savings behavior
through the design of the program. Specifically, she knows that most em
ployees tend to stick with their employer's default plan. Not desiring to try
to make workers worse off, nor to let things lie randomly, she endeavors to
design the program in such a manner as she in good faith believes will be
welfare-maximizing to employees: the default program will allocate

5% of

an employee' s salary to a 40 1 (k) plan, with savings allocated equally
among conservative, moderate, and aggressive investment funds. However,
as a committed libertarian paternalist, the policymaker further wants to pro
vide employees the opportunity to "opt-out" of her default design. But how
does she do this? If she sends new employees an email, say, one month
after their start date with the subject header "Need More Cash Now?" and
explains in the body of the email that employees can increase present con
sumption if they opt-out of the company' s default savings plan, she will
likely induce far more to opt-out than if she sends an email one month after
the employee' s start date that reads "Want Less Consumption Later?" ex
plaining that if employees opt-out of the default plan they will enjoy less
consumption during retirement than they would if they stuck with the de
fault. 1 33 The libertarian paternalist might prefer that the opt-out condition be
presented in a neutral fashion, but the social psychological insight that
sparked the inquiry to begin with is that there is no neutral presentation
available-the manner of presentation

will influence choice behavior, and

in predictable ways. And even as the situation will shape whether opt-outs
occur, the situation will further shape what opt-outers do in the opt-out
condition. For example, the email or memo tucked deep within the em
ployee benefits binder describing the "Default Savings Opt-Out" might
describe opt-out options that included complete opt-out to an all cash sal
ary, or simply a different kind of savings allocation,
and conservative funds. 1 34

as

between aggressive

My students and I manifested a simple allegory of the analytic prob
lem examined here at the start of a meeting of our Law and Behavioralism

133 This would be another example of "framing effects," as well as an example of time-variant
preferences and hyperbolic discounting. See The Situational CluJracter, supra note 6, at 39-49.
1 34 In describing these options the plan designer must further determine whether or not to present
information regarding historical returns of each fund type over the short-term or the long-term. It has
been shown that if the plan designer presents information about savings options in a short-term framing
(of fund returns over a one-year period, for example), it turns out, opt-out employees will be more likely
to choose conservative funds; if the designer presents the information in a long-term frame (of fund
returns over a 20 year period, for example), opt-out employees will opt for more aggressive funds. See
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 20, at 1 1 60 (discussing differences in savings allocations depending on
the frame with which results are presented to plan participants).
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Seminar. 135 Often I bring apples to the seminar, and sometimes donuts or
even chocolate on a holiday. On the morning we were to engage "libertar
ian paternalism," my student facilitators and I conceived the following
scheme: we met in the seminar room before anyone arrived and placed an
apple on most of the desks, in front of some of the desks we placed both an
apple and a donut, and in front of others we placed neither. Then we placed
the open box of donuts and the open bag of apples on a table at the front of
the room, which we told students were available to them as they entered the
classroom. A basic rational actor model would have predicted that students
entering the behavioral circumstance would have chosen to consume apples
or donuts in a manner that maximized the satisfaction of the stable, pri
vately ordered apple-donut preferences that they brought with them into the
room. Actual consumption patterns reflected the central truth of the behav
ioral critique-situation matters . Students with an apple and a donut in front
of their desk were more likely to consume a donut than were students with
just an apple in front of them. Students with nothing placed in front of them
were also were more likely to consume donuts than apples.
This little scene illustrates the analytic problem with libertarian pater
nalism. At first glance it may appear as if we had satisfied the libertarian
paternalist agenda by orienting the students (or most of them anyway) to
wards apples, but ensuring that they were "free to choose" donuts if they
wanted to opt out of our effort to orient them in a maximizing direction.
The problem is that all of the students were "free to choose" donuts, but we
as the social planner influenced whether they would exercise the opt-out
option, either by placing the donut option right in front of them, or placing
it at the front of the room. Further, we had to decide whether to leave the
box of donuts opened or closed. Indeed, we had to decide whether to put the
donuts at the front of the room, or in the hallway, or a classroom next door,
or in the supermarket where we found them. Each of these situations would
substantially affect whether the students chose to stick with the "paternal
ist" path or opted-out for the "libertarian" option. 1 36 Despite the libertarian
paternalist's promises to the contrary, the influence of situation over indi
vidual choice is unavoidable at any turn.
This analytic problem in the libertarian paternalism project results
from Sunstein and Thaler approaching "choice" as an abstract, un-situated
phenomena, and endowing that concept of choice with a power that has no
regard for the situated realities of human choosing behavior. We might call
this choice fetishism-the conception and valuation of choice in a manner
1 35 The following scenario makes no pretense at all to social science; it is merely an effort to use

fully illustrate a reality of human behavior and decision-making that has been well established in social
scientific research. See supra text accompanying notes 96-1 03.
1 36 As will be seen infra, text accompanying notes 152-57, the problem becomes much more diffi
cult when we leave co-operative settings, such as the classroom or an in-house cafeteria, an example we
will see Sunstein and Thaler take up, infra, text accompanying notes 1 47-5 1 .
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that is abstracted away from the situated nature of choosing. 1 37 Where
choice, divorced from situation, is given power and value as

an

end in itself,

and as a normative guidepost, it is fetishized. We desire choice and seek the
feeling of it. Choice fetishism provides the promise, the idea, and the ex
perience of choice, which serves our abiding motives to view ourselves in a
self-affirming manner as being in control and making good choices. 13 8 The
conflation of choice with power maintains choice fetishism. But the

experi

ence of choice does not represent the real operation of power in the behav
ior concomitant to the choice experience. The central lesson of the behav
ioral critique is that this conflation is illusory, no less in our theories than in
our self-conceptions. We do not see the influence of framing effects on our
choice behavior; we experience choice as being wholly free. 139 When per
mitted to operate in legal theory, choice fetishism creates a blindness to
human vulnerability, in particular a blindness with respect to the power of
market actors to engage in market manipulation. As Michael Paulson has
put it, "[t]he vice of fetishization is abdication." 14o
This choice fetishism is evident in the libertarian paternalist positivism
that discerns "free choice" in the "opt-out" conditions in their designs, ra
ther than continuing to see the influence of situation. And it is this choice
fetishism that yields what Sunstein and Thaler identify as a crucial norma
tive principle of the behavioral law and economics approach: "The libertar
ian paternalism that we are describing and defending here attempts to en
sure, as a general rule, that people can easily avoid the paternalist's sug-

137 My use of the tenn "fetishism" is here inspired by its use in a number of different intellectual

traditions; the "accepted definition [holds that) 'fetishism occurs when the mind ceases to realize that it
has itself created the outward images or things to which it subsequently posits itself as in some sort of
subservient position.'" Robert Ferguson, Holmes and the Judicial Figure, 55 U. CHI. L. REV . 506, 543
( 1 988) (quoting DAVID SIMPSON, FETISHISM AND IMAGINATION xiii ( 1 982)). See also the use of this
concept in class analysis, I Karl Marx, CAPITAL 83 (Random House 1 906) (1 867) (explaining "the
Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities,
and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities"), cultural anthropology, Clif
ford Geertz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 1 26-27 ( 1 973) (describing the power of religious
symbols in tenns of their "presumed ability to indentify fact with value at the most fundamental level, to
give to what is otherwise merely actual, a comprehensive nonnative import."), and psycho-analysis,
Sigmund Freud, Fetishism in SEXUALI1Y AND THE PSYCHOLOG Y OF LoVE ( 1 927). See also infra text
accompanying note 3 1 9 (discussing Roberto Unger's notion of institutional fetishism as applied to
corporate law).
1 3 8 See The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 90- 1 15 (reviewing the powerful, but often
unseen, influence of self, group, and system-affinnation motives in human thinking and behavior).
1 39 See id. at 1 24-33 (reviewing studies that indicate that the experience of will, or the "phenome
nal will" as researchers call it, is not co-extensive with the empirical will, that is, the actual exercise of
will).
1 40 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GED. L.J. 2 1 7, 344 (1 994) (criticizing what he identifies as "unhealthy court-worship" in our legal
system).
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gested option." 1 41 It is obviously a strong desire of libertarians, indeed, of
freedom loving peoples everywhere, for it to be easy for people to do

as

they desire in a given situation. But again, the positive analysis that
prompted the inquiry to begin with was precisely that it is

not easy for peo

ple to avoid being influenced by the social planner' s design of the decision
making context. 142 The libertarian paternalist cannot make it easy by fiat.
Rather than free choice itself, what the easy-opt-out injunction engen
ders is an impulse to remove obvious restraints or strong explicit influences
on choice, but which will fall short of attending to more subtle, but power
ful , situational forms of influence. The libertarian paternalist must strive for
the

appearance of unfettered choice and will insist on programs that can

satisfy the charade. It is this key limitation which keeps libertarian paternal
ist analysis from extending its inquiries into the power of market actors to
exercise unseen situational influence over consumers. Market choices will
continue to be viewed

as

dispositional, and the situational influences that

actually continue to shape the behavior will go unexamined. Libertarian
paternalism requires this limitation because the escape-hatch must be put
somewhere, and wherever it is put, the chooser will be construed to be
choosing freely. The libertarian paternalist will likely limit her attention to
salient government restraints, the traditional and highly visible scourge of
the libertarian, and will not sufficiently explore situational influences on
choice that are deployed by market actors, whose influences are, absent
critical inquiry, difficult to appreciate.143 This threat of exploitation and
manipulation slips right past the libertarian paternalist ' s gaze, which is fix
ated on choice.
This analysis of choice fetishism, like the critical realist critique more
generally, should not be misread as suggesting that people do not choose, or
that choice is only ever a chimera. We choose constantly and decisively, but
we choose situationally to a greater degree than we appreciate. l44 At stake is
not whether we have choice or not, but rather whether choice will be under
stood in situated or fetishized fashion. We must in the end choos e how to
behave-to eat a hamburger or not, to supersize the order or not. In truth,
that choice is subject to profound situational influences, oftentimes manipu
lated by market actors with a stake in our choosing. 1 45 The choice fetishist
analyzes and attaches value to the choice to eat or not to eat the hamburger,
irrespective of the situation of that choosing. Choice fetishism robs from us
1 4 1 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 20, at 1 1 86.
1 42 Cf Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 120, at 1 1 94-95.
1 43 See supra text accompanying notes 85-87 (discussing consonance of basic rational actor view

of consumer behavior, and common, intuitive views of consumer behavior).
1 44 The Situation, supra note 6 , at 167; see also The Situational Character, supra note 6, at n.6
(discussing social psychology research which notes that people erroneously tend to conclude a person's
behavior results from a unique disposition, and fail to recognize the important situational factors affect
ing behavior).
1 45 The Situation, supra note 6, at 1 98.
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an appreciation of the deep situational nature of, and influences on, our
choosing. It then robs from us too the reformative impulse that might oth
erwise be inspired in light of such an appreciation. 1 46
The problem of choice fetishism is apparent in the tum that Sunstein
and Thaler briefly take to describe a libertarian paternalist approach to food
consumption behavior.'47 Their approach here is typical of other examples
in their article, in that where they examine conduct by non-governmental
entities such as corporations at all, they focus on the internal governance of
such entities, rather than the entity's operation in external markets. In such
settings, Sunstein and Thaler argue , cafeterias (like savings plans) should be
organized in a manner that would orient people towards good eating deci
sions, but allow them to opt-out if they so desire. Sunstein and Thaler write:
Of course, market pressures will impose a discipline on the self-interested choices of those
cafeteria directors who face competition. To that extent, those directors must indeed provide
people with options they are willing to buy. A cafeteria that faces competition and offers
healthy but terrible-tasting food is unlikely to do well . . . . But profit maximization is not the
appropriate goal for cafeterias granted a degree of monopoly power for example, those in
schools, dormitories, or some companies. Furthermore, even those cafeterias that face com
petition will find that some of the time, market success will come not from tracking people's
ex ante preferences, but from providing goods and services that tum out, in practice, to pro
mote their welfare, all things considered . . . . Would anyone object to putting the fruit and
salad before the desserts at an elementary school cafeteria if the result were to increase the
consumption ratio of apples to Twinkies? Is this question fundamentally different if the cus
tomers are adults? Since no coercion is involved, we think that some types of paternalism
148
should be acceptable to even the most ardent libertarian.
-

This slight passage reveals well the analytic and prescriptive limita
tions of the libertarian paternalist approach. Sunstein and Thaler begin by
accepting that profit-maximizing market actors might have an incentive to
sell unhealthy foods, rather than healthy foods, because that is where the
money is. But they skip past this problem by remarking that profit
maximization is not the appropriate goal for cafeterias with "a degree of
monopoly power." 1 49 But why would Sunstein and Thaler write that profit
maximization is not appropriate for firms with monopoly power? It can
only be that Sunstein and Thaler ultimately remain committed to the view
that so long as markets are operating competitively, market pressure will
force firms to be responsive to consumer preferences, and because consum
ers will ultimately prefer their own welfare, markets will provide it. Sun
stein and Thaler note that even if consumers do not have ex ante prefer1 46 Cj. The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 1 0 1 -06 (exploring system-justification theory
and the palliative function that the system justification motive serves with respect to dissonance that
might otherwise be induced in witnessing the disjunction between our social values and our social
reality).
147 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 120, at 1 165-67.
1 48 [d. at 1 1 65-66 (emphasis added).
1 49 [d. at 1 165.
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ences for healthy foods, "cafeteria owners" might be able to induce such
preferences. 15o Yet having granted that market actors have the ability to
induce preferences, Sunstein and Thaler leave no reason to believe that
market actors will have the incentive to induce healthy consumption rather
than deleterious consumption. All evidence, in fact, is to the contrary. 1 5 l
The critical question, then, is not whether anyone would "object"152 to
putting apples before the Twinkies in schools or corporate cafeterias-the
question is whether market actors, outside the context of the inner workings
of such organizations, should put the apples before the Twinkies, or the
apple stores in front of the Twinkie stores. And the real question behind that
debate is whether or not market actors operating in competitive markets
should always have the sole goal of maximizing shareholder value. 153
Again, this story of competitive markets ever more efficiently and effec
tively satisfying consumer preferences is a crucial component to the domi
nant corporate law paradigm of shareholder primacy. 1 54 The behavioral cri
tique, in particular the problem of market manipulation, undercuts this cen
tral justification for the shareholder primacy norm-the very norm which
propels the kind of dubious, yet largely unseen, situational influence that
firms selling food exercise.155 It may be true that libertarian paternalist poli
cies in a non-market cafeteria design will have the felicitous effect of induc
ing preferences for healthy foods. But a great deal of evidence shows that
profit seeking market actors find it more profitable to induce unhealthy
ones.156 Indeed, firms that miss such profit opportunities will be eclipsed in
competitive markets by firms that find them.157 This fundamental problem is
squarely presented by the behavioral critique, but is left un-theorized by
behavioral law and economics, which seems to contentedly rest on the abid1 50 [d. at 1164-65.
1 5 1 See supra text accompanying notes 15-28 (noting extensive literature documenting problem of

situational manipulation in the food market).
1 52 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 120, at 1186.
1 53 See supra text accompanying notes 56-71 (reviewing the basic law and economics policy script
and the signifying part that profit plays in it).
1 54 See supra text accompanying notes 60-71 and accompanying text. See also, infra text accompa
nying notes 310-318 (suggesting an alternation to this corporate law paradigm in light of the behavioral
critique).
1 55 See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing the problem of "power economics").
1 56 This is not to gainsay that the food market for health foods has not expanded dramatically in
recent years. It clearly has. Jeannine DeFoe, Food Makers Get on a Health Kick: PepsiCo, Kraft, and
Others are Making Strides in Reducing Trans Fats and Producing Healthier Foods to Meet Consumer
Demand, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.businessweek.comlprintlinvestor/contentldec

2006/pi20061214_187559.htm. But it is just as clear that this development has not begun to stem the
tide of the obesity epidemic, which continues to grow, not lessen. [d. Although obesity rates continue to
climb among all social classes, it may be that markets for health foods will develop among more affluent
consumers. I address the class problem in obesity epidemic analysis infra, text accompanying notes 21419.
1 57 See supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing the problem of "power economics").
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ing presumption that competition for profit serves consumers by responding
to their preferences. 1 58
Libertarian paternalism discourse, like broader paternalism debates,
views paternalism as the exercise of power to make people do something
that society (or the "social planner"'59) believes is in people's best interest,
but which people would not choose for themselves, absent the coercion .' 60
This is compared to or set against "anti-paternalism," in which people are
free to choose for themselves what is in their own best interest. What is
typically not squarely examined in conventional or libertarian paternalism
discourse is the problem of coercion being exercised not by government on
behalf of the subject of the influence, but by market actors on behalf of
their shareholders. This pernicious form of influence lurks too often unseen
in the background of paternalism debates that are focused on the legitimacy
of government' s regulation of behavior. It is a problem that Sunstein and
Thaler' s analysis reveals but does not name. Behavioral legal economists
take the view that people may sometimes need social planners to protect
them from themselves because they sometimes make poor or "boundedly"
rational choices. ' 6 1 But these scholars do not appreciate that the real concern
may be that people need protection not from their own poor choices, but
from the exercise of power over their choices by interested third parties in
ways that are often unseen and unappreciated.
The l ibertarian paternalist framework is gaining influence within legal
scholarship.' 62 M. Gregg B loche' s recent Georgetown Law Journal piece,

1 58

Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the Market: Representation of Meaning and Value in Law, Mar
kets, and Culture, 5 1 BUFF. L. REV. 1 , 32 (2003) ("At the same time, we observe that sellers have no
power, since perfect competition means that sellers must respond to consumer demands and preferences
or lose market share to others who will gladly step in to meet the need. This system means that countless
individual consumers drive the allocation of resources by pursuing their own self-interest in the market
place.").
1 59 In Sunstein & Thaler's usage. See supra text accompanying notes 125-3 \ .
160 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 120, at I 1 6O-6 \ . Classic law review articles on the problem
of problem of paternalism, which space precludes me from engaging here, include Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Ton Law, 4 1 MD. L. REV. 563 ( 1 982) (claiming
that there is a strong strain of paternalism in much of the extant law) and David L. Shapiro, Couns,
Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 5 1 9 ( 1 988) (disputing Kennedy's claim, and advocating
a strong anti-paternalist outlook in legal analysis and policymaking). But see The Situation, supra note
6, at 336-40 (critiquing Shapiro's approach).
161 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 1 20, at 1 200 ("We happily grant that planners are human, and
thus are both boundedly rational and subject to the influence of objectionable pressures.").
1 62 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
425 (2006) (discussing libertarian paternalism); Jennifer A. Drobac, A Uniform Domestic Pannership
Act: Marrying Business Pannership and Family Law, 4 1 GA. L. REV. 349 (2007) (making use of liber
tarian paternalism); James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 859 (2006) (applying libertarian paternalism); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the
Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L.1. 5 1 3 (2007) (exploring application of
libertarian paternalist to antitrust); B radley S. Fiorito, Comment, Calling a Lemon a Lemon: Regulating
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Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, while not using the neologism
"libertarian paternalism," nevertheless exhibits all of the elements of the
approach. 1 63 The article, which was meant to serve as a counterpoint to Ri
chard Epstein's writing on obesity referenced above!64 swears an allegiance
to behavioralism, but like Sunstein and Thaler, fails to deliver on the prom
ise:

I shall reject "black box" accounts of personal choice that treat consumers' current eating ha
bits as sovereign expressions of preference. But I will eschew government measures that
would override people's expressed preferences and thus be experienced by Ameri�ans as op
pressive. Instead,

I

will urge efforts to encourage healthier eating and exercise choices by
165

better informing consumers and sharpening their awareness of risks and benefits.

Bloche purports to eschew "black box" accounts of personal choice,
but by bending over backwards to patronize a particular account of the
"black box"-a dispositionist account in which expressed preferences are
granted privileged status-he collapses the coherence and utility of his en
terprise. While he accepts the analytic point that preferences are situational,
he nevertheless promises to respect choice as the manifestation of prefer
ence and, indeed, American freedom. This patronization of the dispositional
delusion keeps the policy discussion wedded to what Roberto Unger has
called "the categories of the newspapers."I66 The only acceptable policy
responses are those that pertain to better "informing" consumers. I am not
arguing that informational campaigns would have no effect. But the behav
ioral critique begins with the understanding that our minds are limited, that
we have limited cognitive capacity. This reality, in and of itself, makes
clear that policy responses urging ever "more" information will never be
sufficient-the problem of information overload or overwhelmance is not a
speculative problem that can be bracketed-out for the sake of analysis. It is
an undeniable and fundamental fact of human existence that legal analysis
must engage at the heart of every inquiry}67 Even with respect to informaElectronic Gambling Machines to Contain Pathological Gambling, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 325, 1358
(2006) (noting Sunstein and Thaler's use of waiting, grace, and cooling-off periods to maximize con
sumer choice-by minimizing consumers' ability to opt-out-in situations "where impulse may be

93 different
Libenarian Pater

overriding reason"). Sunstein and Thaler's term "libertarian paternalism" has been used in
published law reviews and law journal articles since the publication of their article,

nalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra
(JLR) database as of Feb.

note

1 20,

in

2003.

Westlaw search in "Journals and Law Reviews"

26, 2008.

163 93 GEO. L. J. 1 335 (2005).
1 64 See supra text accompanying notes 55-75.
165 Bloche, supra note 163, at 1 338-39.
166 See infra text accompanying note 3 1 9 (making

use of Unger in advancing the reform of corpo

rate law as an approach to grappling with the obesity epidemic).

1 67 See Yosifon, supra note 30,

at

591-601

(arguing that the reality of cognitive limitation, and the

problem of overwhelmance-must be developed more deeply in our assessment of the commercial
speech doctrine).
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tion purveyance, the problem runs deeper than just figuring out "how
much" or "what kind" of disclosure will make people "fully" informed. As
seen in my critique of Sunstein and Thaler,168 the problem is that whatever
form disclosures or warnings take, they will necessarily shape choice in a
particular fashion, rather than enabling the actor to make an authentic pref
erence-based decision.
More importantly, policy debate that is confined to the propriety of
"informational" response is limited to addressing j ust a small portion of the
kinds of unappreciated situational influence on human behavior and deci
sion-making that the behavioral critique reveals. Market actors endeavor to
"regulate" or influence consumer behavior with persuasive informational
appeals as well as other non-informational methods of influence, such as by
expanding their physical presence in the lived environment, manipulating
ingredients, menu items, and portions in ways difficult for us to appreciate
let alone avoid.169 Legal analysis must have a way of conceiving of and re
sponding to such conduct, as the simple fictions of consumer preference
and informed decision-making are inadequate to grappling with the reality
of human decision-making and behavior.
Where progr ammatic imagination can only be exercised within the
domain of "information," proposed solutions to the obesity epidemic can
become rather strange and undignified. For example, Bloche, an influential
health law scholar striving to be responsive to the behavioralist literature
but bound to information strategies, argues that obesity awareness cam
paigns should not simply be fact driven, but rather, should take a more per
suasive orientation:

[no the extent that erotic awareness encourages attitudes and behaviors that keep calorie in
take and use in balance. it is a potential tool in the campaign against obesity. Advertising and
other promotional ventures that connect with our sensual awareness should (while respecting
the constraints of decency) be part of the effort to recast overeating and sedentary living as
unsexy and uncool. 170
In the same vein, Bloche continues:

Health authorities should not present themselves as "food police" or puritan scolds. though
information about health dangers ought to be part of their message. Anti-obesity campaigns
that portray overeating as uncool. athleticism as chic. and slender (but not too skinny) as
sexy are more likely to inspire people. On the other hand. promotional efforts should not shy

168 See supra text accompanying notes 1 22-6 \ .
169 See supra text accompanying note 1 5 (describing broad efforts at situational influence under

taken by the food industry).
170 Bloche. supra note 163. at 1 350.
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from judicious use of shame: portraying obesity as a burden to others (medically and finan
cially) and a sign of self-indulgence can lend force to calls for self-restraint. 1 7 1
Beneath a behavioralist veneer, Bloche's basic assessment is in the end
little different than Epstein' s conventional law and economics diagnosis
and prescription. The key problem in the obesity epidemic turns out to be
individual consumer' s externalizing the cost of their overweight to every
one else, and the solution is to get them to internalize costs. Epstein wants
to do so through insurance reform, 1 72 Bloche wants to do so through sham
ing. Neither is responsive at all to the problem of situational manipulation ,
and neither provides a theoretical justification for regulating the conduct of
market actors, rather than simply focusing on the conduct of consumers.
And the use of behavioralism that is sanctioned to alter consumer be
havior seems particularly perverse. The kind of shaming that Bloche advo
cates literally adds insult to injury. The overweight and obese suffer wide
spread disparagement and discrimination, in their social lives, in their em
ployment, and in public accommodation.173 The overweight and obese also
suffer depression and other psychological disorders in higher rates than the
rest of the population. These realities, coupled with widespread concerns
about body image disorders and incidence of eating disorders and depres
sion related to body image problems, might counsel against the kind of "in
formation" campaign Bloche imagines. Bloche responds to this kind of
criticism by arguing that thin , healthy bodies are "already embedded" as a
cultural ideal in our society and that obesity is a far more serious public
health problem than is anorexia-nervosa. 174 But if this image is already em
bedded in our culture as some kind of an ideal, which surely it is,175 then
that would seem to count as evidence that an information oriented cam
paign of the type B loche imagines would be ineffective as a response to the
obesity epidemic, rather than an argument about why it is not objection
able. 176 This kind of policy, focused on scolding or disciplining the individ-

1 7 1 Id. at 1 354.
1 72 Epstein, supra note 56, at 1 369 & n.29.
17 3 See Donald L. B ierman, Jr., Employment Discrimination Against Overweight Individuals:
Should Obesity Be a Protected Classification?, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 1 , 951 ( 1 990); Elizabeth E.
Theran, "Free to Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious": Weight-Based Discrimination and the Logic 0/
American Antidiscrimination Low, I I CORNELL l. L. & PuB. POL'y 1 1 3, 1 36 (2001).
174 See B loche, supra note 163, at 1350 (comparing rates of obesity and anorexia nervosa and

arguing that because ideals of slimness are already embedded in our culture a campaign emphasizing
them is unlikely to increase rates of anorexia).
175 See Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1 7 1 3-15 (discussing the cultural idealization of thin bodies
and its relationship to the contemporary obesity epidemic).
176 Cf Michael McCarthy, The Economics o/ Obesity, 365 LANCET 2 1 69, 2 1 69 (2004) ("Doctors
tell patients to lose weight. Public-health campaigners urge the public to eat right and exercise more.
Television programs, newspapers, and magazines serve up a steady diet of slimming tips, and diet books
abound. And, yet, more and more people grow fat.").
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ual human mind, without attention to disciplining the situation, is the yield
of an analytic inquiry that simultaneously strives to attend to the basic in
sights of behavioralism while remaining committed to a dispositionist con
ception of human conduct.

B.

The Asymmetric Paternalism Gambit
In a remarkable demonstration of the seemingly oft-recurring phenom

ena of significant new ideas emerging at the same time amid distinct think
ers working within a common intellectual climate, a second set of promi
nent scholars has simultaneously developed an idea that is very similar to
the "libertarian paternalist" concept of Sunstein and Thaler. This second set
of authors--Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Lowenstein, Ted
Q'Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin--call their project "asymmetric paternal
ism."177 I refer to this set of authors as the "Issacharoff group," because
Issacharoff has been an influential voice on the subject of behavioral law
and economics within legal scholarship.178 To the extent that asymmetric
paternalism parallels libertarian paternalism, it falters for the same reasons.
However, there are important differences in the "asymmetric" approach,
which once scrutinized, reveal further the limitations of behavioral law and
economics as a useful analytic approach to obesity epidemic analysis.
The Issacharoff group 's basic idea is that paternalistic policies are j us
tifiable and should be pursued where they provide substantial benefits to
people who are "irrational," while imposing little cost or restriction on peo
ple who are "rational."179 This kind of paternalism, the authors urge, is un
objectionable because "[s]uch regulations are relatively harmless to those
who reliably make decisions in their best interest, while at the same time
advantageous to those making suboptimal choices."18o In a sense, one could
read this "asymmetric" formulation as a potential remedy to the analytic
problem I identified in Sunstein and Thaler's idea of "libertarian paternal
ism."181 That is, if humans really could be divided into categories of "ra
tional" and "irrational" then not only asymmetric paternalism, but also the
"opt-out" imperative of "libertarian paternalism" would make sense (at
least as applied to the "rational" types) and would seem to describe at least
a plausible approach to policymaking. But these categories of human beings
1 77 See Samuel Issacharoff et. aI., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case forAsymmetric Patemalism, l S I U. PA. L. REv. 1 2 1 1 , 1 2 1 2 (2003).
1 78 See Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path From Observation to Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 36 (2002) (urging a slow progress down that path, as far as the use of behavioralism as a guide);
Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1729 (l998)

(doubting it).
1 79 Issacharoff et a1., supra note 177, at 1 2 1 1 - 1 2.
180 [d. at 1 2 1 2.
1 8 1 See supra text accompanying notes 120-32.
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are not suggested by the behavioral critique that spurred the paternalism
inquiry to begin with, and thus "asymmetric paternalism," in the end, pro
vides a poor framework for the legal theoretic understanding of that evi
dence.182
Issacharoff and his co-authors do not make much of an elaborate effort
to demonstrate that the categories upon which their analysis rests are viable;
indeed, their own exegesis suggests just the opposite. They begin their pro
ject in typical behavioral legal economist fashion by stating that social sci
ence has falsified the "rational actor" at the heart of conventional law and
economics in ways that economically oriented scholars must heed. 1 83 Not
atypically, they point to cognitive biases that they claim give rise to the
notion of "bounded rationality"l84 and to visceral factors, such as addiction,
that give rise to the challenge of "bounded willpower." 1 85 After briefly can
vassing such findings, the authors then correctly state that social psycholo
gists have, well beyond their illustrative examples, "catalog[ed] a list of
common

decision-making

errors

that

even

highly

competent,

well

functioning people make in predictable situations." 186 Nevertheless, they
then assert that "those mistakes are far from universal, and we worry that
paternalistic policies may impose undue burdens on those people who are
behaving rationally i n a particular situation."187 There is no reference to any
comprehensive treatment of the lessons of social psychology that would
provide support for this position-that the world can usefully be divided
into rational and irrational types-because none is available.188 Neverthe
less, the authors conclude that the real challenge the behavioral critique
poses to conventional economic analysis of law is to "figure out what sorts
of ' idiotic' behaviors are likely to arise routinely and how to prevent them,
while imposing minimal restrictions on those who behave rationally." 189
When state the central proposition of asymmetric paternalism they do it as a

hypothetical, not as a statement about reality: "To fix ideas, suppose ( 1 ) we
1 82 See also Richard Posner, RatiolUll Choice, Behavioral &onomics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
1 55 1 ( 1 998) (employing the same rational and irrational categorization scheme).
18 3 See Issacharoff et aI., supra note 1 77, at 1 2 14-19.

REv.

1 84 [d. at 1222-23.
18 5 A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, supra note 63, at 1 476-89.
186 [d. at 12 14.
1 87 [d.
188 The only reference given for this truly central feature of asymmetric paternalism argument is to
Issacharoffs 1 998 essay, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, supra note 178, which is

fairly summarized in a footnotes as "noting that substantive deviations from the rational choice model
found in the endowment effect, hindsight bias, and self-serving biases require more research before they
can be incorporated into an accurate behavioral model." Issacharoff et aI., Can There Be a Behavioral
Law and Economics?, supra note 1 78, at 1 2 1 4 n.lD. No doubt. But that is hardly evidence that there are
two kinds of people in the world, rational and irrational, and that legal analysis should proceed from and
adhere to those categories. [d. at 1214 n.lI. See also The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 1 85-86
(critiquing that Issacharoff essay).
1 89 Issacharoff et al., supra note 177, at 1 2 1 8.
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can divide consumers into two types: those who are boundedly rational (in
the sense described above) and those who are fully rational; and that

(2) a

fraction, p, of consumers fall into the boundedly rational category." I90 The
rest of the piece then takes this "suppos[ition]," deployed to "fix ideas," as
the given reality, and proceeds to explicate the implications for legal analy
sis accordingly. Conventional law and economics has been criticized by
behavioral law and economics for taking an unsupportable supposition (the
rational actor) as given for the sake of easing analysis, and yet here the Is
sacharoff group starts law and behavioralism down that same road.
Gregory Mitchell, with somewhat different intentions, deploys the
same "rational" and "irrational" characterization scheme in his assessment
of the behavioral critique.l9l "[I]ndividuals differ reliably in their propensi
ties to exhibit various irrational behaviors,"192 he argues. Mitchell, and pre
sumably the Issacharoff group, rest their claim for this schema largely on
the fact that while decision-making studies often reveal large percentages of
subjects deviating from what a "rational" actor would do in the tested con
dition, such studies almost never find

all subjects so deviating. 193 Such find

ings lead these scholars to conclude that while some people seem to be irra
tional, others are rational. 194 Mitchell himself goes further and argues that
legal theorists are wrong to draw conclusions about widespread "irration
ally" among decision-makers based on social psychology' s findings regard
ing cognitive biases. 195 Mitchell argues that just as surely as they have iden-

1 90 Id. at 1 2 1 9 (emphasis added).

19 1

Mitchell argues that the truth of the rationality-irrationality divide ultimately leads to the con
clusion that, "[i]n short, libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron." Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Pater
nalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 245, 1248 (2005) [hereinafter Libertarian Paternalism].
While he objects to Sunstein and Thaler's project, Mitchell notes that he finds "asymmetric paternalism"
to be basically in accord with his own '''do no harm' approach." Id. at 1 248 n.lO. See also Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907 (2002) (critiquing Hanson and Kysar's Taking Behav
ioralism Seriously series). Cf Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irra
tionality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN . L. REv. 1 620, 1 622-26 (2006) (arguing, inter alia,
that cognitive biases should not be attended to by regulatory response because it will interfere with how
humans learn to think in a discerning fashion). My arguments here, while of course inspired by Hanson
and my work with Hanson, should not be taken as a general rebuttal of Mitchell's critique of Hanson
and Kysar; indeed, my arguments should not be taken necessarily to represent Hanson's (or Kysar's)
views on any of these matters.
1 92 Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1270-7 1 .
1 93 Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1 270-71 and nn.95-96 (referencing literature). See
also infra text accompanying notes 2 1 9-26 (addressing Mitchell's (and the Issacharoff group's) argu
ments regarding "ideographic" differences in decision-making based on gender, race and age). Here I
am concerned with arguments behind the "rational" "irrational" categorization scheme.
1 94 Mitchell, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1263.
1 95 Id. at 1265-67.
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tified biases, social psychologists have also well-documented methods of
de-biasing decision-makers. 196
I believe that such an assessment again misses the most crucial point,
for legal analysis, of the behavioral critique. The point is not merely to rec
ognize that humans think "sub-optimally," or predictably sub-optimally, or
that some humans think sub-optimally some of the time, as behavioral legal
economists take it to be. Instead, the critical lesson of the behavioral cri
tique is that human decision-making can be

influenced in consistent, pre

dictable ways, through exercising influence over the situating of their
choosing, to a far greater extent than our intuitions about the sources of our
own and other people's behavior would lead us to appreciate. To be sure,
some particular version of a study (call it the "alpha" version) may show
that a particular frame given to a decision achieves "only"

65% deviation

from choices that would be expected if people were making "rational" deci
sions. But such findings do not prove that

35% of people are "rational"

types. Indeed, some other framing (the "beta" version) might produce a

75% deviation, or some third ("gamma") a 20% variation, for that matter.
The point is that the frame matters, and more than we tend to believe. 197
196

"Most importantly . . . methods exist for diminishing the effects of choice frames and, even

without debiasing efforts, there are significant individual differences in framing effects." Libertarian

Paternalism, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1247 n.8; see also id. at 1 256-58 nn.40-46 (summarizing literature).
With these premises in place Mitchell has the essence of his conservative critique of libertarian paternal
ism:
[I]t is only if there is no way for individuals to overcome these irrational influences that state
control over citizen choice is inevitable. . . . [Sunstein and Thaler] need to add a premise stat
ing that choice-framing effects are insuperable, but closer inspection of . . . [their] argument
and a consideration of additional empirical evidence reveal that such a premise in not war
ranted.
[d. at 125 1 . I critique Mitchell's argument along with the claims of asymmetric paternalism in the text,
accompanying notes 1 9 1 -2 1 4.
1 97 Consider for example the demonstration of "unbounded situation" in the Milgram experiments
that Hanson and I featured in earlier articles. See, e.g., The Situation, supra note 6, at 150-53; see also
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 1 3-26 ( 1 974). In those
famous studies, Milgram designed an experiment in which subjects were told to administer a "shock" to
a second subject, and to increase the voltage of the shocks at intervals up to 450 volts (marked "Danger

XXX"), whenever the second subject answered questions incorrectly on a memory test. MILGRAM,
supra, at 20. The studies provide a vivid illustration of the unexpected power of situation to influence
human behavior, as many more people engaged in the shocking conduct than either lay people or even
professional psychologists predicted ex ante. See The Situation, supra note 6, at 1 52-53. For present
purposes, consider that in the "alpha" version of the experiment-with the shocked individual audible
but not visible, and the scientist standing over the switch-flipping subject's shoulder-65 % of respon
dents complied fully. [d. Does this mean that the other 35% were "rational," in the sense that they mani
fested or maximized their own stable preferences uninfluenced by the framing in the situation? It does
not, for in Milgram's "beta" version, wherein the shocked subject could be neither heard nor seen,
Milgram achieved 100% compliance. MILGRAM, supra, at 22. The proper way to construe the behavior
of the 35% who did not shock in Milgram's "alpha" scenario is not that they behaved rationally or
dispositionally, but rather to appreciate they were influenced by other, competing situational influences
in the circumstance, such as the screams of the subject, which were, after all, just another situational
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100% deviation from the ra

tional actor model for every person in every decision context before the
behavioral critique can be considered relevant as a general matter. After all,
even if people made decisions randomly, sometimes the randomness would
accord with what the rational actor model would predict--even a broken
clock is right twice day-but that does not mean that the categories of "ra
tional" and "irrational" are viable. 198
More importantly, while it may be true that our cognitive and motiva
tional biases are capable of being ameliorated, legal theory cannot be san
guine about the prospect of such de-biasing taking place without addressing
the problems of power economics and market manipulation. When social
scientists examine and influence their subjects' behavior, the scientists are
typically doing so from a relatively benign perspective-they are endeavor
ing to develop a deeper understanding of human decision-making and be
havior.199 But in understanding the legal theoretic import of that social sci
ence, it is crucial to depart from this perspective and to bear centrally in
mind the more precise incentives of market actors endeavoring to exercise
situational influence over consumer choice. Market actors are not j ust ob
serving and shaping influence, as the social scientist does. Rather, they are
endeavoring to shape behavior

in a particular direction-that is, towards

greater consumption of the firms' goods and services.2OO
The "asymmetric" premise is untenable because it conceives of our
cognitive capacities and choice behaviors as if they were operating in a
vacuum. It conceives of human cognitive biases and limitations as if they
were locked within our minds innately affecting us to greater or lesser ex
tents, from within. The analysis does not address the

endogeny of biases

and cognitive limitations, that is, the extent to which they are subj ect to
exacerbation, manipulation, and exploitation in given circumstances, such
as in particular consumer markets. The difference between the critical real
ist picture and the behavioral law and economics approach is not a dispute
about what the science tells us-it is an analytic dispute about how the ma
terial is to be used in legal theory. Behavioral legal economists are quick to
worry about the motivation and competence of government actors, but they

influence of Milgram's, as the "shocked" subject was really an actor, a collaborator in the exercise of
situational influence within the experiment. See The Situation, supra note 6, at I SO-53; see also
MILGRAM, supra, at 32-43 (describing different responses based on proximity to victim variables).
19 8
Cf Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 1. POL. ECON. 1 , 4 ( 1 962).
Becker critiques the notion that downward-sloping demand curves constitute evidence that people think
rationally; Becker pointed out that with limited resources consumption drops with prices even if people
make decisions randomly, not rationally. Id. at 6-7.
.
199 The Situation, supra note 6, at 1 88 (noting that social scientists "should be committed to exam
ining the implications of what we know to be true, no matter how much we want to deny it, and reject
ing what we know to be false no matter how much we want to embrace it").
200 The Situation, supra note 6, at 226-27.
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are remiss in their inattention to the motivation and the enormous compe
tence of profit-seeking firms in competitive markets.201
The absence of attention to the possibility of manipulation leads these
scholars to embrace an easy agnosticism on the critical question of whether
consumer "cognitive error" likely results in too much or too little consump
tion: "[I]t is not necessarily the case that firms will be hurt; if consumer
errors are in the direction of buying too little, asymmetric paternalism may
bring the beneficial side effect of increasing firms' profits."202 Under this
conception, consumer "mistakes" are exogenous to the market and firms
passively either benefit from the "mistakes" or are harmed by them, or may
be harmed by social planning that helps keep consumers from making these
mistakes.203 The critical realist perspective suggests a more precise orienta
tion of the problem, at least as an analytic presumption in certain circum
stances.204
This problem is illustrated in Issacharoff and his co-authors' discus
sion of the application of their project to consumer behavior in markets for
extended warranties on electronic devices. The question emerges in this
context because "[t]he fact that [extended warranties] are enormously prof
itable to retailers implies they are costly to buyers.''205 According to Issa
charoff, the asymmetric paternalist is now perplexed:

Should we treat those who would be prone to purchase them as though they are modem
equivalents of minors or idiots? It depends on whether overpaying for a warranty is a mistake
or a preference (a "bug" or a "feature" in the human mind). Perhaps people who buy warran
ties do not realize how slight the chance is that the product will break within the warranty pe
riod, or the fact that the small loss they have to pay for repairs out-of-pocket can be easily
absorbed into the hedonic ups and downs of everyday life. On the other hand, it is also possi
ble that consumers who purchase warranties are perfectly cognizant of the relevant probabili
ties and derive real benefits (e.g. "peace of mind") that warrant the expenditure. In the face
of such uncertainty, the right policy is one that encourages disclosure rather than, say, ban
warranties . . . . If informed consumers continue to purchase the warranties, then it is quite
possible that they have good reason to do so, however unfathomable that decision may seem
to an economist.206
There is no consideration of the fact that consumer purchases of war
ranties might not stem from a "bug"207 in the mind

or a stable ''feature''208 of

that mind, but rather from the situational influences i n the store-the sales
person, and the myriad of situational pressures on the other hedonic ups
and-downs of life. The problem with the "bug" conception of the behavioral
201 [d. at 227.
202 Issacharoff et aI., supra note 177, at 122 1 .
203 [d. at 12 19.
204 See supra, text accompanying notes 24-29 (discussing power economics).
205 Issacharoff et aI., supra note 1 77, at 1253-54.
206 [d.
207 [d.
208 [d.
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critique i s that i t makes i t appear as if merely providing "more" information
about the likelihood of the product breaking will exterminate the "bug" and
allow for the stable dispositional "features" of the mind to mind to manifest
the authentic preference. But the essence of the behavioral critique is that
the framing of the disclosure will inevitably influence expressed prefer
ences. If the disclosure is framed in X manner we will likely see

N fewer

extended warranty purchases; if it is framed in Y manner we are likely to
see

N*2 fewer extended warranty purchases. As with opt-outs, this problem

is inescapable; there is no disclosure design that will reveal the warranty
purchases once and for all to be preferences rather than bugs. However,
consumer decisions in this arena do not have to remain "unfathomable"209 to
economists or legal analysis. They can be understood, or a prudent ap
proach to their understanding can be established, if one begins with the
problems of unbounded situation, power economics, and market manipula
tion, rather than seeing the problem as a difficulty in discerning the rational
actors from the idiots.
Still, there remains the question of how to properly assess the fact that
situations in a given circumstance do not influence all people the same way,
as is evidenced both by the inconstant responses of subjects in many formal
studies, and of course is very obvious in any kind of study or observation of
human behavior. Issacharoff and his colleagues,2IO Mitche1l2l 1 , Sunstein and
Thaler,2 1 2 and also Eptsein and Posnef 1 3 believe that such differences are to
be accounted for by differences in individual disposition, and therefore such
differences are to have important, indeed, decisive, normative implications.
However, if we continue to restrain the dispositionist impulse and hold, for
the sake of analysis, to an "unbounded situation" approach, we can easily
see a deeper situational influence, and not a deeper dispositional inclination
in varied behavior.
This can perhaps be done most easily if we again extend our behav
ioral perspective beyond the choice biases that have so strongly grabbed the
attention of behavioral legal economists. In the context of the obesity epi
demic, for example, it is crucial to appreciate some counter-intuitive reali
ties not just about human cognition, but about the human eating system as
well. Consider an intriguing and illustrative piece of evidence regarding the
situational nature of "rational" or "irrational" eating behavior. Some studies
of highly social, hierarchically ordered groups of non-human species have
found that

non-dominant members of such groups tend to gain more weight

in times of abundant food availability than do their more dominant counter-

209 [d.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 1 77-9 1 .
2 1 1 See supra text accompanying notes 9 1 - 1 1 6.
2 1 2 See supra Part III.
2 1 3 See supra Part II.
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partS.214 This might at first seem backwards, but researchers argue i t is ex
plained by the fact that the dominant individuals, by virtue of their status,
always have first dibs on food, and so are less likely to go hungry during
periods of scarcity; they thus need not anticipate scarcity to ensure their
survival .215 Similarly, it is well known that the poor in America suffer from
obesity in greater numbers than do higher status groupS.216 Studies of hu
mans have repeatedly associated eating behavior with threats of economic,
social, and personal insecurity.217 Understanding that there may be an im
portant relationship between the human impulse to overeat and vulnerabil
ity to the threat of scarcity, helps to explain what would otherwise be a
counter-intuitive finding: some studies have shown that women eligible for
and participating in food-stamp programs are less likely to suffer obesity
than are those who are poor enough to qualify but are not participating in
the program.218 The poor, whose ranks suffer obesity more than the wealthy,
are not less rational than other groups, nor is their food consumption behav
ior the expression of authentic privately ordered preference. Nor are the
different-and healthier-eating patterns of higher status individuals proof
of their greater rationality. These findings suggests that it is the

situation of

vulnerability, the threat of insecurity, which may induce within humans the
orientation to eat a lot when food is available, and further, that the repose of
high status may induce less impulse to eat than is felt by the vulnerable.219
21 4 See, e.g., Jan B. Ekman & Kristjan Lilliendahl, Using Priority to Food Access: Fattening Strat·
egies in Dominance Structured Willow Tit (Parus montanus) Flocks, 4 BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY 232, 237
( 1 993); C. W. Clark & Jan Ekman, Dominant and Subordinate Fattening Strategies: A Dynamic Game,
72 OIKOS 205, 2 1 2 ( 1 995). Both articles cited in Trenton G. Smith, Reconciling Psychology with eco

nomics: Obesity, Behavioral Biology, and Rational Overeating 2 1 , (Wash. State Univ. Sch. of Econ.
Scis. Working Paper No. 2006-4, 2006).
21 5 Ekman & Lilliendahl, supra note 2 1 4, at 232 ("Priority to food access did not correlate to either

acquisition rate or net turnover of body reserves, but subordinates with low food availability had larger
body reserves than dominants."); Smith, supra note 2 1 7, at 1 7 (associating food insecurity with obesity).
216 See Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1 725-26, I S04 05 (noting greater problem of obesity among
poor, blacks, and Hispanics).
2 1 7 See Elizabeth J. Adams, Laurence Grummer-Strawn, & Gilberto Chavez, Food Insecurity is
Associated with Increased Risk of Obesity in California Women, 1 33 J. NUTRITION \070, \073 (2003)
(noting a correlation between obesity and socioeconomic status); But see Lucia Kasier et aI., Choice of
Instrument Influences Relations Between Food Insecurity and Obesity in Latino Women, SO 1. CLINICAL
NUTRITION \ 372, 1 377 (2004) (noting conflicting findings regarding the strength of the association
between food scarcity and obesity).
2 1 8 See Michele Ver Ploeg, Lisa Mancino, & Biing-Hwan Lin, Food Stamps and Obesity: Ironic
Twist or Complex Puuje?, 4 AMBER WAVES I , 35 (2006), www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves ("Among
women, food stamp participants are not getting relatively heavier over time. Rather, BMI has grown
more among eligible nonparticipants-and even among women with higher incomes-than for food
stamp recipients.").
219 Studies have demonstrated that poor neighborhoods have fewer supermarkets than do wealthier
neighborhoods while also having a high percentage of fast food restaurants. Ronald Cotterill & Andrew
Franklin, The Urban Grocery Store Gap 14 (Univ. of Connecticut, Food Mktg. Policy Issue Paper No.
S, 1995), available at http://www.fmpc.uconn.edulpublicationS/ip/ipS.pdf; Amanda Shaffer, The Persis-
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O n this reading, it is not different kinds of people who are rational o r irra
tional; it is differently situated people who behave as if they are more or
less rational, depending on the situation. Thus, even if we do choose to call
one of these patterns of behavior "rational" and the other "irrational," very
different normative implications follow if we see such categories as stem
ming from situational rather than dispositional sources. From the situation
ist perspective, limitations on "choice" opportunities for the rational, out of
concern for the irrational, begins to look more like ameliorative justice ra
ther than it does the restriction of individual freedom.
There are also important racial dimensions to the situation of obesity
that may lead us to question the wisdom of deploying a rational/irrational
categorization scheme in analysis of the problem. Some studies have found
that particular racial groups have a greater genetic susceptibility to obesity
than do others.22o If this is true, then stopping at reforms that are sufficient
for some races but insufficient for others would be profoundly unfair
indeed, it would be racist. Here, the influence of our dispositionism threat
ens to be particularly pernicious. For example, perhaps a policy reform no
more dramatic than "more information" would curb the obesity epidemic
among racial groups with less vulnerability to obesity. In our dispositionism
we are likely to see that group 's collective "choice" to maintain a healthy
bodyweight as principally reflecting disposition (discipline, good personal
choices, rationality), and will find it easy to disparage on dispositional
grounds (laziness, bad personal choices, irrationality) the continued obesity
of other races. By attending to our differing genetic situations and not only
our dispositional "choices," we may be able to see behavioral differences
stemming from situation, rather than from the content of one ' s character.
Respectfully inverting King's formulation in this context provides an angle
through which the threat of racial injustice in a rational/irrational categori
zation scheme can be deciphered.221

tence of LA. 's Grocery Gap: The Need For a New Food Policy and Approach to Market Development
20 (2002), available at http://departments.oxy.eduluepilcfj/publications/Supennarket%20Report%20
November%202002.pdf. See also infra, text accompanying notes 297-302 (discussing zoning and other
regulatory refonns as a policy response to the obesity epidemic).
220 Haas, supra note 74, at 2 107-08 (finding higher obesity rates among adolescent "AsianlPacific
Islanders" and "Latinos" to be greater than among "Black" and "White" adolescents; black and white
adolescents were found to be overweight a similar rates); Timothy Richards et aI., Native American
Obesity: An Economic Model of the "Thrifty Gene " Theory, 88 AMER. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. I (2006)
(noting that alarmingly high levels of obesity among Native Americans has been attributed to, inter alia,
a "genetic predisposition" to obesity); Trenton G. Smith, supra note 214, at 1 7 - 1 9 (collecting sources).
22 1 See Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1 963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 2 1 7, 2 1 9 (James Melvin Washing
ton ed., 1 986). It may be that there are genetic differences in individual susceptibility to obesity irre
spective of race, an appreciation of which may also yield a more sensitive analysis of the propriety of
different kinds of regulatory response to the problem. Where such differences fall along racial lines,
however, given our legal history, a particularly urgent social justice problem is presented.
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In addition to class and race, there are of course important cultural di
mensions to the unbounded situation of the obesity epidemic. Different
cultures and sub-cultures embrace different kinds of body-types as ideal or
desirable.222 Any analysis of the obesity "epidemic" must be sensitive to and
respectful of such distinctions. Yet a respectful posture need not lead to the
Posner-ian conclusion that there is no obesity crisis.223 Indeed, critical as
sessment of such cultural trends may yield surprising and troubling insights.
A "cultural" preference for large-body types may be deeply evolutionary
and biologic in the same troubling fashion as is seen with respect to class
and racial concerns. Some studies, for example, have found that "in cultures
with scarce resources, heavier women are preferred; while in cultures with
abundant resources, thinner women are preferred."224 One study found that
men dissatisfied with their own financial situation or who were hungry at
the time they were surveyed preferred heavier women than did men who
were at ease with their financial situation or satiated at the time of the sur
vey.225 Thus, revealed preferences again may suggest more about situation
than it does about individual or group disposition. In an unbounded situa
tion approach we must appreciate the formation and operation of those as
pects of ourselves even of which we are consciously aware, yet mistakenly
perceive as disposition.
Appreciating situational differences in decision-making and behavior
i n this fashion should make it clear that the basic normative thrust of
asymmetric paternalism, which enjoins the analyst to aid the "irrational"
only where doing so would impose little cost on the "rational," is not le
gitimate. Having already benefited from being situated "rational," it is not
clear why the rational should further benefit from social policies primarily

222 See Rachel E.K. Freedman et al., Ethnic Differences in Preferences for Female Weight and
Waist-to-hip Ratio, 5 EATING BEHAV. 1 9 1 , 1 9 1 (2004) (examining "ethnic differences . . . in male
preferences for ideal body size and shape in women" and finding that "African-American men were
more likely to choose heavier figures as ideal than White American men did"). One study of racial
differences in perception about obesity found that within the population studied (university students)
found that "all heavy white females perceived that they were heavy, compared to only 40% of heavy
black females. 78% of heavy white males considered themselves heavy versus only 36% of heavy black
males." Sharon M Desmond ct al., Black and White Adolescents' Perceptions of Their Weight, J.
SCHOOL HEALTH 59(8):353-358 ( 1989), cited in Perceptions about Obesity: Racial Differences, Nutri
tion
Research
Newsletter,
(Jan.
1 990),
available
at
http://findarticles.comlp/articleslmi_m0887/is_n 1_v9/ai_83 54049.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 77-87 (discussing Posner's economic analysis of the obesity
epidemic).
224 Smith, supra note 2 14, at 24 (citing A. Furnham & P. Baguma, Cross-Cultural Differences in
the Evaluation ofMale and Female Body Shapes, 1 5 INT'L J. EATING DISORDERS 8 1 , 8 1 -89 (1994» .
225 Leif D. Nelson & Evan L. Morrison, The Symptoms of Resource Scarcity: Judgments of Food
and Finances Influence Preferences for Potential Partners, 1 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1 67, 1 72 (2005).
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with their interests, at the expense of those unfortunate enough to be situ
ated as "irrational. "226
Asymmetric paternalists have not applied their theory to the obesity
epidemic in particular in any extended treatment, but as with Sunstein and
Thaler, what they have said bearing on the matter expresses well the limita
tions of their project as an approach to obesity epidemic analysis. In a re
vealing passage, Issacharoff and his co-authors embrace social policies that
have emerged in health and food regulation as a guiding beacon for the
project they are attempting to establish:
Health and food regulations are heavily infonned by scientific understanding (albeit an un
derstanding sometimes captured by special interests) and by a widespread belief among pro
fessionals that average folks require infonnation, prodding, and often regulation to improve
their health and diet. Thus are born paternalistic policies such as food content labels, warn
ings on cigarette packs, active anti-tobacco advertising, and FDA grading. We envision a
vaguely similar system which, substituting the phrase 'economic judgment' for the phrase
'health and diet' in the preceding analogy, leads to a similar mix of information, persuasion,
227
and regulation.

If these are asymmetric paternalist policies, and if these are the model
to which asymmetric paternalism aspires, then the approach is clearly not
up to the task of generating reliable social policy. After all, this obesity
epidemic has emerged on the watch of such policies. "Asymmetric pater
nalism" offers little more potency in terms of policy innovation than does
conventional law and economics or libertarian paternalism. Indeed, it seems
unlikely that it could authorize anything more than the inadequate "more
information" gambit, as at least one of the Issacharoff group authors has
elsewhere suggested.228 Issacharoff has now been repeating for nearly a
decade his claim that "behavioral economics is in an early stage of devel
opment, and therefore its findings should elicit more caution than those
from more ' mature ' fields (which are by no means themselves invulnerable

226 Gregory Mitchell takes issue with the distributional consequences of libertarian and asymmetric
paternalism from the conservative perspective that such approaches redistribute too much from the
rational to the irrational. See Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1 269-76. My argument in the
text is meant in part as a rebuttal to Mitchell's claim.
227 Issacharoff et aI., supra note 1 77, at 1 222-23 (footnote omitted).
228 Co-author Colin Camerer states:
I am not eager to see much broad paternalism without doing more research . . . . In our Penn
Law Review paper . . . [we] argued for a middle ground you might call 'conservative pater
nalism' (we called it 'asymmetric paternalism' in our paper). Conservative paternalism is a
set of policies which may help a few people who make judgment mistakes a lot, and impose
very little hann on people who behave rationally. Examples include infonned consent, dis
closing information which profit-motivated firms may not disclose voluntarily (such as nutri
tional content of food or drug efficacy), mandatory waiting periods (which exist for marriage
and divorce), and 'cooling-off laws which allow consumers to break contracts for purchase
of certain consumer goods.
Colin Camerer, Research: Policy Applications, http://www.hss.caltech.edul-camerer/web_materiall
pa.htrnl (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
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to revision). "229 By more mature fields, of course, he means conventional,
unreconstructed law and economics. But the power of the behavioral cri
tique has made a highly deferential posture towards that framework impos
sible to sustain.230

IV.

THE USES AND LIMITATIONS OF CULTURAL COGNITION THEORY
It seems fair to say that a number of people who would be opposed to

a robust regulatory response to the threat of obesity would probably be,
generally speaking, the same people you might find supporting a very ro
bust regulatory response to, say, the threat of terrorism. It also seems fair to
say that a number of people who would be in favor of a robust regulatory
response to the obesity epidemic would probably be the same people you
would expect to find arguing against a robust response to the threat of ter
rorism. Obesity will no doubt kill and disable many times more Americans
over the next several decades than will terrorists, the latter would argue. Yet
the former will say that the threat of terrorism is much greater, as not only
uncertain numbers of lives, but also our very way of life is at stake. Both of
these sets of arguments rely, at some level, on factual premises about just
how "risky" each one of these independent threats is to our society. How do
people come to different conclusions regarding the facts supporting their
beliefs about these threats?
Section V briefly reviews and tries to add to the landscape of possible
policy responses to the obesity epidemic. Before reaching that Section, it
will serve well to consider the question of present public opinion on the
obesity problem. Whatever else may be said to emerge from survey data on
the subject, it seems clear that the American people are not uniformly op
posed or in favor of robust obesity regulation. One detailed survey of public
opinion on the obesity problem found, for example, that 57% of respon
dents agreed or strongly agreed that "junk food and fast food" ads on televi
sion should be regulated by the federal government "the way they do for
cigarettes and alcohol," while 36% percent disagreed or strongly disagreed
with such a proposal. 231 47% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that
junk food should be banned from schools, while 43% disagreed or strongly
disagreed with such a policy.232 48% of respondents agreed or strongly
agreed, and 42% disagreed or strongly disagreed, that "[0 ]verweight people
229 Issacharoff et aI., supra note 1 77, at 1214. See also similar warnings from Issacharoff in his
articles cited supra note 1 78.
2 3 0 See The Situational Character, supra note 6, at 1 64 n.776 (noting that this call to yield cau
tiously to the more mature sciences rings hollow when it is appreciated that psychology and the social
decision sciences have been around a lot longer than law and economics or, arguably, economics itself).
2 3 1 J. Eric Oliver & Taeku Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of Obesity in America, 30 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 923, 934-35, 950 (2005) (reviewing their own 2001 study).
2 3 2 ld. at 935, 950.
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should be subject to the same legal protections and benefits offered to peo
ple with other physical disabilities."233 Thus, there is divergent opinion on
the obesity issue, just as is seen on so many other important social policy
questions-terrorism, global warming, guns, abortion, gun control, the war
on drugs, to name just a few. Nevertheless, I believe that the consensus
necessary to agree on and implement obesity reforms can be accomplished.
In examining such a possibility, I will review, and have occasion to cri
tique, another exciting idea to emerge recently from the law and behavioral
ism movement: cultural cognition theory.234
Cultural cognition theory begins at that familiar starting place of the
behavioral critique-the understanding that our minds are limited, such that
we can only take in and make sense of a small amount of information in the
world around us. To deal with our cognitive scarcity we have developed a
myriad of cognitive mechanisms, including the use of heuristics, which we
use to assess the world around us. Cultural cognition theorists argue that
one of the basic heuristics that we rely on is our set of cultural values:
[E]ssentially, cultural commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged political is
sues . . . [C]ulture is prior to fact in the cognitive sense that what citizens believe about the
empirical consequences of those policies derives from their cultural worldviews. Based on a
variety of overlapping psychological mechanisms, individuals accept or reject empirical
claims about the consequences of controversial polices based on their vision of a good soci
ety. 235

These "vision[ s] of a good society" might be described and catego
rized in a number of different ways, but cultural cognition theorists argue
that a useful framework with robust empirical support can be built on world
view classifications "along two cross-cutting dimensions: ' group,' which
characterizes how ' individualist' or 'comrnunitarian' a person's cultural
orientation is; and ' grid, ' which characterizes how 'hierarchical' or 'egali-

233 [d.
234 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & P OL'y REv. 149, 1 5 1 -57 (2006) [hereinafter Cultural Cognition] (providing an overview of
cultural cognition theory); The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://research.yale.edul
culturalcognition! (providing additional resources on cultural cognition). Kahan and Braman have ex
plored their idea fruitfully in the gun control debate. Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the
Fear of Guns. The Fear of Gun Control. and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun
Debate, 55 EMORY L.l. 5 69, 571 (2006) [hereinafter Overcoming] (arguing that citizens accept or reject
empirical data in the gun control debate based on their cultural vision).
235 Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at 1 50.
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tarian' it is. "236 People ' s views about different kinds of risks can be mapped
along these classification schemes. For example, "individualists" tend to
"reject claims o f environmental risk" yet think there is a substantial risk that
"excessive gun control will render individuals unable to defend them
selves."237 The operation of the "individualist" world-view heuristic pro
duces these correlations. On the other hand, "communitarians," by opera
tion of their world-view heurists,

do think that environmental risk is a sig

nificant problem, yet are not moved to concern about the risk of being left
defenseless against other individuals bearing arms against them.238 Kahan
argues these associations are:
the statistical smoking gun of cultural cognition. There is no reason to believe that hierarchs
and individualists have better or worse access to information about societal harms than egali
tarians or communitarians, or that any one of them is more or less reliant on heuristics in in
terpreting such information. The only cogent explanation for the clustering of beliefs among
persons who share such orientations is that culture is indeed entering into the social and psy
239
chological processes that determine their perceptions of risk.

Cultural cognition theorists point to a number of psychological mecha
nisms driving our worldview heuristics .240 Crucial among these is our ten
dency to trust and rely on the views of the people who share our world
view.241 Most of us form our views on controversial subjects without formal

23 6 The framework can be graphically rendered like this:
GRID

GRCMJP

�t

--------1-

Solidari.stI Qmununitarian.

Id. at 1 53 (citing MARy DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 54-68 (1 970» .
237 Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REv. l iS , 123 (2007).
23 8 See id. (contrasting communitarians with egalitarians, who "worry . . . that excessive gun con-

trol will render individuals unable to defend themselves.").
239 [d. at 1 24.
240 Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at I SS-56.
24 1 Id. at 1 57.
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study of the often cacophonous scientific analysis of the questions.242 In the
absence of exhaustive study, when "members of society disagree about the
harmfulness of a particular form of conduct, we instinctively

trust those

who share our values-and whose judgments are likely to be biased in par
ticular direction by emotion, dissonance avoidance, and related mecha
nisms. "243
Kahan and his co-author rightly contend that this exegesis presents
"not just a puzzle to be explained but a problem to be solved."244 In light of
the problem of cultural cognition, Kahan argues, policymakers and advo
cates should embrace an "expressive overdeterminism" in their assessment
of pressing social problems.245 That is, discourse on public policy should
strive on any given issue to be responsive to the particular cognitive frame
works of numerous different world-views.246 Such an approach promises to
ameliorate otherwise intractable social discord, in a manner that is broadly
satisfying.247 For Kahan, a quintessential example of successful expressive
over-determinism is France's abortion law.248 After decades of acrimony
between groups and individuals with different world-views and concomi
tantly differing positions on the question of whether abortion should be
legal or not, France finally adopted a law which holds that abortion is per
missible only after a woman has obtained certification that the abortion was
necessitated by an "emergency."249 The medical certification of "emer
gency" is not reviewable as a legal matter.250 Nevertheless, according to
Kahan, such a framework was satisfying to individualists who favored ac
cess to abortion, while simultaneously expressively validating, and thus
satisfying, communitarians concerns for the sanctity o f life.251 It is impor
tant to appreciate that under cultural cognition theory this is a

sincere con

ciliation that leaves everyone better off.252 The secret to the sincerity is that
people are in reality much more concerned about the maintenance and vali
dation of their world-views than they are concerned about specific social
policy disputes.253 Where world-views are not threatened, fewer intractable,
socially debilitating and anxiety-producing policy disputes emerge in public
discourse.254
242 See id. at 149.
243 Kahan, supra note 237, at 1 1 7.
244 Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at 164.
245 Kahan, supra note 237, at 145.
246 Id.
247 See id. at 1 5 1 -53.
24 8 Kahan, supra note 237, at 146.
249 See id.
2 50 /d.
25 1 Id.
25 2 See id. at 1 52.
253 See id.
254 Kahan, supra note 237, at 152.
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Exploring the potential application of expressive overdeterminism to a
social policy problem in the United States, Kahan and his co-authors turn
their attention to gun control debates.255 In our society some people are in
favor of gun control and others are against it-both rely at some level on a
factual predicate regarding whether guns make us safer or not.256 There are
in fact, Kahan and his co-authors argue, divergent social scientific findings
respecting whether gun control laws result in less or more gun violence.257
Again, it is highly unlikely that most Americans who support or oppose
such laws have reviewed and critically assessed such studies.258 Instead, by
operation of "cultural cognition," communitarians tend to believe such laws
effectively stem violence, while individualists tend to believe such laws
lead to vulnerability and ultimately more violence.259 Facing this predica
ment, Kahan and his co-authors suggest an expressively overdetermined
gun-registration "bounty" system, wherein gun owners would be paid a
certain amount of money to register their guns with law enforcement.26o
Such a policy "would affirm. the cultural identities of both gun-control sup
porters and gun-control opponents simultaneously because both could see it
as an effective and fair solution to a collective action problem-even with
out agreeing what that problem is."261 The bounty system is responsive to
the egalitarian's concerns about the risk of violence from unregulated guns,
while also expressing to individualists that their decision to own a gun is a
good one, evidenced by the bounty they receive in the form of a cash pay
ment.262 Such expressive over-determinism ameliorates the need to deter
mine who is "right" or "wrong" in the gun control debate; indeed, that ques
tion has been quieted as a salient matter of social discord.263
In his most recent extension of cultural cognition theory, Kahan argues
that "expressive overdetermination" should replace "public reason" as the
principled mode of policy discourse in liberal societies.264 "Public reason
ing" refers to a prominent norm of liberal discourse, promoted by political
theorists such as John Rawls, which holds that arguments favoring a par
ticular social policy should be advanced with reference to "the 'overlapping

2 55 See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture, and
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 1 9 soc. JUST. REs. 283, 288 (2005) ("The adoption of expressively over
determined policies by identity vouchers can be expected to change the common perception that the
outcome of the gun-control debate is a measure of the social status of competing social groups."); see
also Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at 1 58-59 (discussing the gun control debate).
2 56 See Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at 1 58.
2 57 Id. at 1 58 nn.38-39.
2 58 See id at 149.
2 59 See id at 1 58.
260 !d. at 1 70.
261 Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at 1 70.
262

d.
J

263 See id.
264 Kahan, supra note 237, at 1 5 1-53.
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consensus' comprising values common to all (reasonable) comprehensive
views and distinctive of none of them."265 Under the norm of public reason
ing, policies should not be advanced with reference to a specific world view
or a comprehensive vision of the good or the good life, as this will threaten
to alienate and even to subjugate one's adversaries, just as the exercise of
such an approach by our adversaries might threaten to alienate or subjugate
US.266 But Kahan argues that, from a cultural cognition perspective, public
reasoning is both impossible and undesirable.267 We are always inevitably
influenced by our own world-view, both in our assessment of current condi
tions and in our pursuit of reform. Similarly, our adversaries, guided by
their world-views, are unmoved by what they (it turns our rightly) suspect
is superficial public reasoning on our part, serving as pretext for the ad
vancement of a more sectarian purpose.268 The liberal discursive ideal of
"public reason" is a failure and our discourse is, and must necessarily be,
illiberal

because

of

our

cognitive

limitations.269

Expressive

overdeterminism "stands public reason on its head"270 and enjoins us to
"infuse[]"271 our discourse with expression in such a manner that "every
cultural group can find affirmation of its word-views within it."272 This can
be instrumentally effective, as evidenced in the abortion and gun control
examples.273 But it is also ethically and normatively estimable, Kahan ar
gues, as the discursant is obliged to explicitly acknowledge the manner in
which the policy she advocates advances her own cultural values, and she is
further made explicitly conscious of its effect on other people's cultural
values.274
Cultural cognition theory can no doubt plausibly explain the lack of
consensus in our society on the question of the obesity epidemic.275 A recent
study by Abigail Saguy and Kevin Riley analyzing "framing contests" over
obesity on the part of anti-obesity researchers and advocates on the one
hand, and "fat acceptance" researchers and advocates on the other, reveals

26 5 Id. at 143 (internally quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LiBERALISM 1 75, 2 17-1 8 ( 1993» .
266 See id. at 143-44.
267 See id. at 144.
268 Id. at 144-45.
269 Kahan, supra note 237, at 1 44.
270 Id. at 145.
27 1 Id.
272 Id.
273 See Cultural Cognition, supra note 234, at 1 68-69, 1 70.
274 Kahan, supra note 237, at 145. One might be tempted to think that this is just what politicians
already try to do-it is Clinton-ian triangulation. Kahan argues that politicians are indeed the ones who
really have need of expressive over-determinism, but their commitment to the norm of public reasoning
keeps them from succeeding. Id. at 1 50. To the extent that they succeed politically, it is typically be
cause the politician managed to appeal to the particular world-view of their supporters, rather than by
fmding consensus. See id. at 149-50.
27 5 See supra text accompanying note 23 1 .
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conceptual and discursive patterns that can plausibly b e construed under the
cultural cognition framework.276
Saguy and Riley acknowledge that "[t]he view that obesity is a serious
health problem dominates studies of obesity."277 Predictably endeavoring to
conform to the norm of public reason, anti-obesity academics and activists
have framed their efforts in terms of shared, overlapping values of prevent
ing harm278 and curbing enormous health care costS.279 However, in accord
with the chronic "illiberalism" diagnosis of cultural cognition theory, Saguy
and Riley argue that the writings and statements of these scholars and activ
ists reveal that "debates over the nature of the condition have largely hinged
upon underlying moral assumptions about fat individuals and their behav
iors.»280 Saguy and Riley find that "a risky behavior frame" dominates anti
obesity discourse, a frame that "emphasizes the extent to which body
weight is under personal control and implies that those who are fat have
unhealthy lifestyles while the thin make good food and exercise choices."281
Even as these authorities exhibit "a general recognition that body weight is
not completely under personal control, a risky behavior framing dominates
antiobesity literature and [in] . . . interviews with antiobesity researchers,
especially in discussion of remedies for obesity."282 Further, among "pro
fat" researchers and advocates who deny that obesity is a significant social
problem and promote cultural acceptance and l egal rights for "fat"283 peo
ple, Saguy and Riley similarly find an explicit, but superficial, adherence to
the norms of public reason.284 Much like their anti-obesity adversaries, "pro
fat" scholars and activists point to scientific studies that dispute the extent
to which obesity is associated with adverse health.285 They further argue that
it is discrimination against the obese generally, and in the provision of
health care in particular, and not obesity itself, that accounts for distinctions
276 See Abigail C. Saguy & Kevin W. Riley, Weighing Both Sides: Morality, Mortality, and Framing Contests Over Obesity, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & LAW 869, 869-70 (2005).
277 ld. at 875.
278 ld.
279 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & K. A. D. Camara, The Tragedy oj the Human Commons, 29
CARDOZO L. REv.

479, 48 1 (2007).
280 ld. at 87 1 .
2 8 1 ld. at 883.
282 ld. at 884.
283 A number of people who write on the obesity epidemic freely use the word "fat," sometimes
noting that it is has been embraced by "fat activists." See generally Theran, supra note 1 73 (using the
word "fat" to discuss the problems of obesity). As it seems to me that many people do fmd that word
coarse or insulting, I prefer usually to use the terms overweight or obese.
284 Saguy & Riley, supra note 276, at 908, 9 1 5 .
2 8 5 See, e.g., Saguy & Riley, supra note 276, at 874 (discussing activists and researchers who
disagree about whether obesity has adverse health effects); Theran, supra note 1 73 at 1 5 1 ("there is
increasing evidence that an individual's fitness level-i.e., in terms of cardiovascular health, strength,
and endurance-is not much related to his/her weight, and that many of the health risks often touted as
associated with obesity may in fact stem from inactivity, regardless of weight. ").
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found in the health status o f the overweight and obese.286 Saguy and Riley
argue that upon closer examination the discursive patterns of these advo
cates reflect anxieties about identity and status preservation-concern about
being stigmatized and made into "a bogeyman"287-rather than reflecting
the norms of public reasoning.288 We need not artificially force this evi
dence into cultural cognition theory's categorization scheme in order to
appreciate Saguy and Riley's suggestion that there is a cultural values heu
ristic operating behind people's views on the obesity epidemic. Both groups
think they are basing their own claims on reason, while thinking that the
other group is blinded to the truth of the matter by their worldview. In fact,
both groups are right about the other, but neither is right about itself.
Expressive overdeterminism might help produce some kind of consen
sus on how to respond properly to the obesity epidemic. One could imagine
an overdeterministic idiom o f obesity epidemic analysis. On behalf o f indi
vidualists, obesity analysts advocating a robust regulatory response to situ
ational influences on the problem might emphasize that what is at stake in
this quandary is the dignity and individual freedom of people in our society.
To the communitarian, the harms suffered by the overweight and obese
might be emphasized. Nevertheless, the problem with Kahan's approach is
the agnosticism it exhibits with respect to the world-views he identifies.
Just as Kahan claims that his critique of public reason is not political but
cognitive, my critique of expressive-overdeterminism is cognitive, not po
litical. I urge a counter-intuitive scrutiny of the dispositionist discourses
that are running amok through our world-view heuristics. Kahan would
have us patronize them. As I have argued in the previous Sections, such
patronization leaves the analyst chronically inattentive to the problem of
market manipulation, which remains unseen, un-theorized, and unregu
lated.2 89 Indeed, it plays no part in the basic framework of cultural cognition
theory. Instead o f an ecumenical expressive overdeterminism, what we
need are discursive "rules"or suggestions that give attention to the biases of
our

world-views,

decisional

rules,

presumptions,

and

orientations

discourse that might in cumulative fashion expel the heuristics our behav
ioralism has aided us to discredit.
Indeed, if Kahan's argument is that social discord is a result o f expres
sive under-determinism, then another way o f putting his point might be that
where we do see relative consensus, there might already be overdetermin
ism at work in the discourse. While people express different opinions about
obesity when asked, the obesity epidemic is hardly a hot-button social is-

2 86
2 87

Saguy & Riley supra, note 276, at 883.
Id. at 893 (quoting their own interview with Mariln Wann, a prominent figure in the fat accep

tance movement).
288 See also Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1 726-27 (providing a parallel exegesis with respect to
system justification theory and the conception of obesity entertained among people who are obese).
2 8 9 See supra Part II.A.
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sue. The absence of deep antagonism may be reflective of a present consen
sus on the issue, and this may suggest that discourse on obesity is already
expressively overdetermined. The root of that overdeterminism is disposi
tioni sm. It speaks to, influences, and quiets concern about the obesity epi
demic across particularized world-views. If this is true, then what we need
is a discursive idiom that will disrupt this consensus. One way of doing so
is to repudiate dispositionism and develop a discourse on unbounded situa
tion.
Further, it is crucial for the cultural cognition theorist to appreciate
again that our cognitive predicament is not happening internally, within
"bounds. "290 Worldviews and worldview heuristics are sought after and
contested, on a playing field that is not level. As I have emphasized, market
actors have an abiding interest, indeed, an existential interest, in the main
tenance of dispositionism.29 1 In explaining the persistence of differing as
sessments of public policy problems, Kahan credits a kind of ironic by
product of an important norm within formal scientific discourse: "[T]he
academy tolerates and even encourages competitive dissent. As a result,
cultural advocates will always be able to find support from seemingly quali
fied experts for their perception that what' s ignoble is also dangerous, and
what's noble benign."292 But this is too naIve and too sanguine a view of the
production of science surrounding controversial social issues. As Hanson
and Kysar showed that with respect to the smoking "controversy," the to
bacco industry was able to "capture" scientific discourse on the subject by
pumping millions of dollars into research to create the appearance of varied
scientific opinions on an issue which in science, was unadulterated by such
influence-settled.293 Such studies provided the ambiguity that smokers,
already motivated to doubt the science indicating that their addiction was
deadly, needed to continue viewing their own smoking as unproblematic.294
The cacophonous discourse on smoking was thus neither a product of the
internal norms of science nor those of public reasoning generally-it was
the result of manipulation, a manipulation to which we, by operation of
world-view heuristics and other psychological processes, were vulner
able.295
In previous work, I have endeavored to demonstrate that the same
"deep capture" process is evident within broad social discourses surround290 See supra text accompanying notes 1 08- 1 1 (critiquing the idea of "bounded" rationality).
29 1 See infra text accompanying notes 306-21 (emphasizing the crucial part that dispositionism
plays in corporate law).
292 Kahan, supra note 237, at 1 24-25.
293 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 1 12 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1467-1 553 (1 999) (describing industry efforts to ma
nipulate consumer-risk perception regarding smoking, with specific reference to manipUlation of sci
ence).
294 [d. at 1 506.
295 [d.
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ing the obesity epidemic.296 I do not advocate an expressively over
deterministic idiom, but instead, at least with respect to obesity analysis, an
idiom that is determined to discern and restrain the power of world-views
that in our social discourse are already cognitively advantaged and dispro
portionately patronized.
v.

AMELIORATING THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: A CORPORATE LAW
APPROACH

Lawrence Gostin has usefully categorized eight types of interventions
presently available to stem the tide of overweight and obesity: disclosure,
tort liability, regulation of food marketing to children and adolescents, taxa
tion, school and workplace policies, zoning regulation, health monitoring
and surveillance, and food prohibitions.297 Efforts in these areas are under
way in many places, most at the state and municipal leveI.298 The cumula
tive effect of such policy innovations will no doubt contribute substantially
to curbing the obesity epidemic. The foregoing analysis has meant to ex
plore why such reactions are necessary and justifiable. Such efforts, as I
suggested earlier, have to date largely been directed at children.299 I intend
the foregoing exegesis to provide an understanding of the importance of,
and the j ustification for, extending such efforts to adults. Further, I have
emphasized the importance of not mistaking regulatory responses that are
appropriate for the affluent, or for people of specific genetic backgrounds,
as policies that will be responsive to the needs of everyone.3OO
But there are also reasons to doubt that such regulatory approaches are
likely to be successful. First, the problem of dispositionism will make it
difficult to engender broad public support for strong versions of most of the
approaches Gostin catalogues. Second, irrespective of public opinion, there
is the problem of regulatory capture. The narrow interests of food compa
nies, coupled with their size and their concentrated wealth, give them tre
mendous advantages over dispersed consumers in the competition for regu
latory favor.30 1 These two problems converge in the problem of deep cap296 See Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1 757-69; Yosifon, supra note 30, at 5 1 9-25.
297 Lawrence O. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier Lifestyles and Prevent Obesity, 297
1. AMER. MED.

Assoc.

87 (2007)

(reviewing the basic arguments in favor or against each of these

approaches).
298

See generally id. (describing local government and states' efforts to utilize various legal tools to
curb behavior leading to obesity).
299 See supra text accompanying note 1 5 .
300 See supra text accompanying notes 2 1 7-22.
301 See generally MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION AND HEALTH (2002) (analyzing corporate influence on state and federal regulation of food
industry); see also MICHELE SIMON, ApPETITE FOR PROFIT: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY UNDERMINES
OUR HEALTH AND How TO FIGHT BACK (2006) (analyzing food industry influence on food policy).
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ture-the corporate promotion and entrenchment of a particular, disposi
tionist conception of consumer behavior, to both regulators and consumers
themselves.302 In light of this entanglement, I will conclude here with a brief
examination of one additional idea that might be added to the taxonomy of
available policy responses to the obesity epidemic. I propose a corporate
law solution.
As I previously stated, the obesity problem is polygenetic.303 I did not
intend anything in this Article to suggest that the problems of power eco
nomics and market manipUlation are the sole or even the principle causes of
the obesity epidemic. Nevertheless, I have argued that there can be little
doubt that these dynamics are at least part of the problem, and that they
should be remedied. I have argued that the kind of market manipulation
evident in the obesity context results from the ravenous pursuit of profit by
powerful corporations operating in competitive markets. Behind both the
power and the pursuit is corporate law.
Our corporate law bestows tremendous advantages on corporations
that allow them to efficiently gather large amounts of capital. These conces
sions include limited l iability, indefinite life, and favorable taxation, to
name just a few.304 Such aggregation enables economies of scale and other
efficiencies that make corporations very powerful. The purpose that our
corporate law intends to be served by such power, however, is the public
interest. 305 According to leading corporate law scholars Henry Hansman and
Reinier Kraakman, "all thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise
should be organized and operated to serve the interests of society as a
whole, and that the interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in
this social calculus than do the interests of any other member of society."306
After all, while shareholders certainly have some property interest in the
stock they invest in, they surely do not have the right to the benefits be
stowed on the corporate form in law.307
302 See supra notes 49-55 (discussing "deep capture").
3 03 See supra Part l.A.
304 Chen & Hanson, supra note 67, at 54, 144, & n.505.
305 Jd. at 66.
306 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History For Corporate Law. 89 GEO. L J .
439, 441 (200 1).
307 I am deliberately flouting the "nexus-of-contract" theory of the fmn in favor of the "entity"
.

theory, but only as a matter of exegesis. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing
COLUM. L. REv. 23 1 , 24 1
(2008) (defminig the "nexus of contract" theory as a conception of "the corporation as an equilibrium
among actors, including shareholders, creditors, and managers, who bargain within a complex set of
relationships with the corporate entity at the center"). The real point is that both theories must rest
ultimately on a "public interest" justification. I read Hansmann and Kraakman to sanction this conflation
in The End ofHistoryfor Corporate Law:
In a hoary debate that cuts across jurisdictional boundaries, proponents of the view that cor
porations exist by virtue of a state "concession" or privilege have also been associated with
the view that corporations ought to be governed in the interests of society-or all corporate
Equity: Public Ownership. Agency Costs. and Complete Capital Markets, 108
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In what may at first blush appear to be a paradox (or worse), while the
purpose of our corporate law is the public interest, the central

rule of our

corporate law is that firms should primarily pursue profits on behalf of
shareholders.3og Indeed, while they insist that all "thoughtful"309 people
know that corporations are public institutions, Hansmann and Kraakman
also write that "[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder
value."3 I o Corporate theory unravels the seeming paradox by explaining that
the shareholder primacy norm

does serve the public interest, and that it does

so better than would any alternative norm for corporate conduct.3 1 1 Share
holder primacy, like other concessions, creates a strong incentive for capital
investment. Such accumulation serves worker interests by creating oppor
tunities for employment; more profits mean more opportunities for further
investment and employment.3 1 2 Consumers, my focus here, similarly benefit
from the efficiencies from capital aggregation that shareholder primacy
provides.3 1 3 Economies of scale and the diligent pursuit of profit give firms
the power and the discipline to provide products and services for consumers
at competitive prices.3 1 4 Escalating profits thus signal heightened states of
consumer preference satisfaction.3 15 Consumers are able to monitor their
stake in the social enterprise of the firm through their decisions to consume
corporate goods and services or not.3 1 6 Consumer interests are also backed

constituencies-rather than in the private interest of shareholders alone. Conversely, propo
nents of the view that the corporation is at bottom a contract among investors have tended to
advance the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate governance. In our view the tradi
tional debate between concession and contract theorists is simply confused. On the one hand,
corporations-whether "concessions" or contracts-should be regulated when it is in the
public interest to do so. On the other hand, the standard model is, in effect, an assertion that
social welfare is best served by encouraging corporate managers to pursue shareholder inter
ests.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 306, at 44 1 n.5 (internal citations omitted). In other words, "[a]1I
thoughtful people" must see that contract theories rest on a particular kind of regulatory apparatus (one
which, for example, enforces agreements) and thus must ultimately seek justification in consequentialist
claims, no less than do entity theories, which emphasize the more specific benefits that corporations
receive in law. See also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAIL URE OF CORPORATE LAW 45-47 (2007); Chen &
Hanson, supra note 67, at 87-88 (dissecting the false categories of "markets," on the one hand, and
"regulations," on the other).
3 08 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 1 70 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1 9 1 9) ("A business corporation is organ
ized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.") See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1 998).
3 09 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 306, at 441 .
3 10 Id. at 439.
3 1 1 Id. at 444 & n.7.
3 12 Chen & Hanson, supra note 67, at 47.
3 1 3 Id. at 22.
3 1 4 Id.
3 1 5 See generally Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1689.
3 1 6 Id. at 1690.
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by other regulatory institutions, including consumer protection statutes.3 1 7
While the consumer can monitor the firm at the cash register, after share
holders have invested their capital, there is little opportunity for them to
watch over or control what is done with it. The open-ended nature of capital
investment, coupled with the absence of shareholders from corporate con
trol, requires that firm directors be bound to shareholder interests by the
golden yoke of fiduciary obligation.318
Roberto Unger has urged legal scholars to shun what he calls "the fet
ishization of institutions," a problem he describes as:
the belief that abstract institutional conceptions, like political democracy, the market econ
omy, an d a free c ivil society, have a single natural an d necessary institutional expression. in
stitutional fetishism is a pervasive type of superstition in contemporary c ulture. It penetrat es
each of the disci plines mentioned carlier [including legal analysis], and it informs the lan
guage and debates of ordinary politics. The old-fashioned idea of en lightenment would today
b est be appli ed to efforts to dispel the institutional fetishism vitiating orthodox doctrines in
each of the social disciplines. Di spelling it would be the full-time job of a generation of so
319
cial critics and social sci entists.

The view that we are at the "end of history" for the basic design of
corporate law reflects the fetishization of institutions that Unger laments.
The behavioral critique can help us to break the spell of this fetishism, and
it can inform our imagination of alternative institutional arrangements.
There may indeed be many areas of the economy and our social life in
which shareholder primacy operates quite effectively, but even the broad
viability of the norm does not mean that it is appropriate in all areas. It may
be socially useful in particular in the area of food to depart from the share
holder primacy norm. With a realistic picture of consumer behavior in food
markets in place, we might easily see that in this context consumers are in

3 17

Indeed, the availability of other regulatory agencies is, within the shareholder primacy regime, a

cruc ial backstop for protectin g the int erests of any stakeholdres that cannot, given finns' advantages,
cannot effectively use contract to protect themselves.

A

point which Hansmann and Kraakm an un der

score:
Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law does not imply that
the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go unprotected. It merely indicates that
the most efficacious legal mechanisms for protecting the interests of nonshareholder con
stituenci es--or at least all constituencies other than creditors-lie outside of corporate law.
For workers, this includes the law of labor contracting, pension law, health and safety law,
and antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it includes product safety regulation, warranty
law, tort law governing product liability, antitrust law, an d mandatory disclosure of product
contents an d characteristics. For the public at large, it includes en vironmental law and the
law of nuisance and mass torts.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note

306, at 442.
3 1 8 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 306, at 441 -42

script);

see also GREENFIELD, supra note 306,

note

(critiquing the script).

67
319

(adumbrating the basic elements of this

at 234-236 (critiquing the script); Chen & Hanson,

supra

ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 7 ( 1 996), avail

able at http://www .law.harvard.edulfaculty/unger/english!whatsa.php.
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as much need of a place in the boardroom, representing their interests, as
are shareholders. The consumer relationship to food need not solely be me
diated by contract, tort, and administrative agencies-it can happen also in
corporate law.
It is clear that the competitive ferocity enflamed by the shareholder
primacy norm has contributed substantially to the obesity epidemic.320 This
influence could be contained if firms in this market were made fiduciaries
of consumers as well as of shareholders. This corporate purpose could be
served in part by a consumer advocate representative on boards of directors.
Consumers at large could elect such an advocate, exercising voting shares,
though having no residual claims on profits. Such advocates would serve as
agents of the public in the internal decision-making processes of the firms.
Beyond specific consumer representatives on the board, the fiduciary obli
gation of the entire board of directors might be expanded to require care not
just of shareholder interest, but also consumer interest.32 1
Traditional corporate law scholars argue that acrimony and board pa
ralysis would ensue if "stakeholders" other than shareholders were given a
place in the boardroom.322 As Ron Chen and Jon Hanson point out, this
claim seems to be at odds with the fundamental justification of the profit
norm, from the perspective of consumers ' interests, which is that firms are
good at knowing what consumers want and are motivated to give it to them,
that is, that consumer and corporate interests are already aligned.323 The
problem of acrimony is only introduced when different stakeholders indeed
have at least potentially adverse interests. Yet corporate law need not nec
essarily fear acrimony. As Kent Greenfield argues in connection with his
support for worker representation on boards:

Making the board less insulated and less homogenous will make decisions more difficult
simply because more views will have to be taken into account, and the board will be forced
to compromise on a decision that is acceptable to a majority or plurality of stakeholders . . . .
The real question is whether additional diversity results in decisions that are worth the extra
effort, and here there is reason to be hopeful. Numerous studies have shown . . . that 'defec
tive decision making' is 'strongly correlated' with structural flaws such as 'insulation and
homogeneity. ,324

320

note 1 5 5 and accompanying text; see also Broken Scales, supra note 6, at 1 688.
This is a combination of co-determination and multiple-constituent approaches to corporate law
reform. I am informed here by Kent Greenfield's exegesis and proposal regarding worker representation
on corporate boards. Supra note 307, at 146-52.
322 See Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 307, at 445 ("The growing view today is that mean
ingful direct worker voting participation in corporate affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions,
paralysis, or weak boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits that worker
participation might bring."). Curiously, Hansmann and Kraakman's otherwise meticulously referenced
article provides no citation for this proposition. Id.
323 Chen & Hanson, supra note 67, at 47.
324 GREENFIELD, supra note 307, at 1 5 1 .
321

See supra
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Even with respect to corporate boards, there is evidence that the most
contentious boards are the most successful.325 Indeed, many of our institu
tions and methods of social and personal decision-making embrace the
creative value of discursive antagonism, or at least of giving different views
opportunity for expression.326 There is no reason that corporate decision
making necessarily needs to be an exception. Again, the claim is not that
consumers should always be fiduciaries of all firms they do business with,
but rather to suggest that they might be for some types of firms. While food
is in some ways like any other consumer good, it also unique in its funda
mentality-it is an essential and basic ingredient of human life. And, as I
have argued, its deeply evolutionary nature, perhaps maladaptive to present
circumstances, is one that is both opaque to our conscious understanding
and unusually susceptible to situational manipulation.
If a fiduciary concern for consumers were insufficient, more aggres
sive approaches are available within corporate law. One possibility would
be to remove the shield of limited liability from firms operating in certain
areas of the food market. The benefit of limited liability is the tremendous
incentive it provides to capital investment. The justification for it rests pri
marily on the idea that limited liability is merely a contract term to which
anyone who deals with a corporation agrees. That sunny tale, of course, is
not so warm to the uncompensated tort victim who did not negotiate her
terms with the firm. Corporate law has no effective answer to this problem
other than to point to alternative remedies for tort victims, such as common
law tort claims, first party insurance, and social safety nets.327 One reason to
remove limited liability for some kinds of food firms would be to ensure
that victims identified by tort law in the area of overweight and obesity can
be made whole. Indeed, removing limited liability may even follow neces
sarily if we were to adopt the previous suggestion of recognizing fiduciary
obligations to consumers. But another reason to remove limited liability
might be for the express purpose of stunting the growth of markets that
such limited liability creates and exploits. Limited liability makes it possi
ble for people to invest money and walk away clear of any consequences of
their capital. In areas of social life where ill consequences predictably result
from easy capital aggregation, the engines of limited liability may be doing
more harm than good.
The corporate law reforms suggested here might substantially help the
obesity problem in this country. Such reforms are not an alternative to pre
sent policy responses, but rather should be advanced alongside them. As
3 25 ld. (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 28 (2003) (quoting Jeffrey A.
Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, 80 HARv. Bus. REv. 1 06, I I I (2002» ).
3 26 For example, deliberative democratic processes, the adversarial system, etc.
32 7 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability,
1 00 YALE L.J. 1 879 ( 1 99 1 ) (arguing that a general rule of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for
torts provides greater efficiencies than does the contemporary unlimited liability regime).
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Greenfield wrote advocating worker representation on Boards as an ap
proach to the problem of stagnant worker wages, "[0]ne need not conduct a
comprehensive comparison of corporate law tools with various other regu
latory initiatives to decide that changes in corporate law offer great possi
bilities . . . . [T]he durability of the problem[] indicates that new initiatives
from corporate law should be seriously considered."328 Indeed, making food
firms fiduciaries of consumers might make it much easier to pursue reform
through other regulatory institutions, such as those listed by Gostin, as
those institutions may now be freed by multi-fiduciarism from their capture
by shareholder primacy.
It should be clear that there is nothing in this institutional experimenta
tion that unduly limits individual choice. This is not about banning any
product or discourse. Gregory Mitchell argues that the reformative impulse
of the behavioral critique is, from the libertarian perspective, unfairly redis
tributive:
If the cafeteria director helps diners with low self-control gain some greater control over their
impulses and eat less, then she may need to raise prices, meaning that diners with high self
control may now bear some of the cost of the libertarian paternalist policy. In general, in any
domain where resources are limited and the increased costs of a libertarian paternalist policy
cannot be externalized the cost of increasing benefits to irrational persons is likely to be
329

borne by rational persons.

But neither shareholders nor other consumers are entitled to the spoils
of power economics. It is only by manipulating "low self-control" consum
ers that prices are kept low for high self-control types. Where that manipu
lation is made possible by the benefits bestowed in corporate law, those
with high self-control have not lost anything to which they are entitled
when prices rise due to changes in those benefits.
CONCLUSION

The proposals advanced here are relatively modest. I embrace the pos
ture of humility that Issacharoff has promoted in all of his writing about the
implications of "behavioral ism. "330 The critical suspicion and a scrutiny that
has motivated the foregoing theoretical inquiry into obesity epidemic analy
sis must also be brought to bear on the policy prescriptions such inquiry
suggests. Reformative incrementalism is attendant to the general humility
that our social science informs us we would be wise to hold with respect to
3 28 GREENFIELD, supra note 307, at 1 83.
3 29 Libertarian Paternalism, supra note 1 9 1 , at 1 274 (footnote omitted).
330 See supra text accompanying notes 1 78-2 19. Similar warnings appear in Issacharoffs other
articles. See generally Issacharoff, The Difficult Path From Observation to Prescription, supra note 1 78;
Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, supra note 1 78.
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any of our theories about ourselves and the world, given our cognitive limi
tations and motivational biases. Moreover, just as our social science reveals
that we should be cautious when guided by our intuitions, the history of
social science and the sciences generally is replete with corrections, rever
sals, and repudiations of beliefs once held to be true. Incrementalism and
skepticism are thus the proper pace and posture. The prudence of such hu
mility, however, should not be taken to cast doubt on the urgency of the
need for refonn, nor the strength of the j ustification for it.
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